to apply, and when, because both of the writers mentioned above dared to violate
the rules on occasion. Indeed, it is not likely their achievements would have been
as brilliant otherwise.
Since the early 1980s when the US army officially embraced the operational level
of war, American doctrine has distinguished the art from the level; unfortunately,
much confusion still surrounds the terms. The former is officially defined as ‘the
application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs – supported by their
skill, knowledge, and experience – to design strategies, campaigns, and major
operations and organize and employ military forces’. 4 The definition makes rather
too much of ‘creative imagination’, whereas ‘design’ is what should be stressed.
Achieving success is ultimately what matters, whether done creatively or not.
The operational level, in contrast, is defined as the command echelon at which
the design of operations takes place. That echelon has traditionally been located
at corps and higher formations, since the resources necessary for campaign
planning and coordination were not to be found in division headquarters. 5 The
explicit purpose behind institutionalizing the operational level of war was to
establish ‘a level of activity that would connect tactical actions and strategic
purposes’. 6 While the level undoubtedly did that, it also insulated the study of
tactics from political interference, thus facilitating the perfection of war’s first
grammar. In fact, some have justly argued that operational-level processes tend to
take strategic planning out of the hands of policy makers. 7 Still, the American
military is hardly unique in gravitating towards the study of tactics, which are as
concrete as they are essential. It is also not surprising that the creation of an
operational level, quite distinct from the art, would encourage this inclination.
Operational art is the principal element in any party’s art of war. An art of war
includes not only operational art, but also military strategy. Operational art is, in
a word, the ‘way’ that is used to move military means in the direction of achieving
strategic aims. It is tempting to consider operational art in isolation of both the
aims it is supposed to serve as well as the means it has at hand: it thus takes on an
abstract and wholly theoretical quality. To prevent that, the following discussion
will occasionally touch upon the strategic aims at stake in each of the conflicts as
well as the quantities and types of forces available. To underscore the point by
means of analogy, a fencer ought to know not only the art of fencing in a
theoretical sense (the different capabilities and limitations of the epee and the
sabre, for instance), but also whether the blade one plans to use is appropriate to
the aim we wish to achieve, and reliable in combat. Even exquisite knowledge of
the art of fencing would avail little if we arrived at the contest with a ceremonial
dagger while our opponent came armed with real sword.
Until the second half of the twentieth century, US operational art rarely
differed in concept from its European counterparts. In practice, however, it was
uniquely complicated by the fact that, each time a war broke out, it was necessary
to mobilize, train, equip, and deploy large numbers of men and material across
vast oceans. These circumstances contributed to inconsistent operational perfor-
mance, and high casualties, in many of America’s first battles. American officers
were typically forced to learn quickly, while, at the same time, attempting to earn
138 The Evolution of Operational Art