the respect of more experienced allies and foes. A central planning body was only
established after the Spanish–American War (1898); modelled along the lines of
the German general staff, its purpose was to conduct contingency planning. 8
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, American operational doctrine
called for conducting offensive operations aimed at defeating an opponent’s main
force. It was a doctrine that pitted strength against strength, and it was considered
valid for land operations as well as those at sea. Operational art was referred to as
the ‘operations of war’ and was defined as the ‘means and methods’ for achieving
victory. Terms, such as plan of campaign, theatre of operations, and lines of
operations, were in common use. 9 None of the US military’s experience before
the Great War—a major civil war, campaigns against Native Americans, and
several small wars—had contradicted the doctrine.
The expansion and modernization of the US navy were also under way, partly
in response to the rapid economic growth of American industry and commerce in
the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
theories of sea power provided a rationale for establishing a ‘blue-water’ navy,
while also reinforcing the offensive doctrine of pitting strength against strength.
Although Mahan’s ideas were fairly complex and evolved over time, they rest
upon four fundamental assumptions: (a) competition, if not conflict, among
nations was perpetual; (b) the chief arena for that competition in the modern era
was the seas; (c) a large navy of capital ships was the best tool for securing sea lines
of communication; and (d) diplomacy worked best when it followed a successful
decision at sea. 10 Mahan’s theories were essentially battle-centric, aimed at
achieving a decision at sea by a clash of arms. This was the doctrine with which
the US navy went to war in 1917.
THE GREAT WAREven after more than a decade of reforms, the US military was hardly ready for a
mass, industrial-age conflict in Europe. The US army was a mere constabulary
force of 100,000 officers and men with some experience fighting rebels in the
Philippines and bandits in Mexico; the US navy had 64,000 officers and men and
300 ships, with an operational emphasis on battleships. 11 War was declared in
April 1917, but mobilization was fraught with friction at every level; Allied and
German strategic estimates appeared correct in not expecting the United States to
contribute significantly to the war until 1919. 12 Although mobilization, overseas
deployment, and logistical support are not strictly part of the operational art,
they clearly influence what that art can achieve in practice. If the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF) of two million soldiers could not be assembled,
deployed 3,000 miles, and supported, then any operational doctrine calling for
massing combat power would have been useless.
Despite the strategic forecasts and repeated efforts by Allied commanders to
feed American soldiers into the French and British armies as replacements, the
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