forcing already conservative bureaucracies to become almost miserly in terms of
the number and types of programmes they would fund.
A great deal of effort went into extracting lessons from the AEF’s experiences in
1918, which were discussed and debated and eventually incorporated into the
military education programmes at the staff and war colleges. However, the shift to
a national policy of isolation negatively influenced the development of the US
army’s operational doctrine by depriving it of a strategic logic. In a word, the
army’s doctrine became schizophrenic, caught between two opposing tendencies.
On the one hand, the 1923 version of theField Service Regulationsemphasized the
use of offensive operations to achieve military objectives. On the other hand, the
Manual for Commanders of Large Units(1930), which was intended to supple-
ment theField Service Regulationsand fill a doctrinal gap by providing some
much-needed guidance for higher commanders, reflected what, for some, was the
war’s most important lesson—the power of the defensive—and infantry–artillery
cooperation. It advocated a defensive doctrine similar to the approach found in
the French army’sInstruction provisoire du 6 Octobre 1921 sur l’emploi tactique des
grandes unites[Provisional Instruction on the Tactical Employment of Large
Units] (1921); indeed, as the commandant of the US Army War College noted
in 1938, theManual for Commanders of Large Unitswas essentially a translation of
that manual. 22 As one officer noted, the publication of theManual for Comman-
ders of Large Unitswould leave the US army with a ‘hybridized tactical doctrine
which would produce the utmost confusion’. 23 Nonetheless, the manual was
published.
The utility of theManual for Commanders of Large Unitswas also questionable,
given the publication in 1926 of the US army’s manual forGeneral Tactical
Functions of Larger Units. TheGeneral Tactical Functions of Larger Units, which
provided a framework of sorts to enable commanders to link tactical actions
together, clearly showed that operational planning was being further developed.
Among other things, this publication identified five main components or phases
of plans of operations: ‘mobilization, concentration, advance, occupation of
positions, and combat’. 24 It is clear that mobilization was considered one of the
principal components of American operational art.
TheGeneral Tactical Functions of Larger Unitsalso reaffirmed the primacy of
tactics in war’s first grammar: ‘Where tactical and strategic considerations con-
flict, tactical considerations must govern. The gaining of decision in combat is of
primary importance’. 25 The idea of placing tactical considerations above strategic
ones is not unusual in military thinking. In the face of seemingly vague or
contradictory policy guidance or strategic objectives, it is natural to default to
grammar. However, this gave commanders tacit approval to ignore strategic
considerations. In short, theGeneral Tactical Functions of Larger Unitsalso
shows that, even early on, theraison d’eˆtreof operational art was tactical success.
Notwithstanding its earlier schizophrenia, by the late 1930s American opera-
tional art remained centred on the idea of applying as much combat power as
possible to achieve a decision on the battlefield. In fact, the US army’sPrinciples of
Strategy(1936) stressed, in bold letters, that the first law of strategy was ‘BE
142 The Evolution of Operational Art