STRONGER AT THE DECISIVE POINT’. 26 During the 1920s and 1930s, con-
cepts, such as centre of gravity and culmination point, saw greater prominence in
US military theory and doctrine. 27 The centre of gravity was defined as the
enemy’s main fighting force. The culminating point was defined essentially as a
point which, brought about by the ‘inevitable process of weakening’, ‘...does
not assure any future success’ for the attacker. 28 That these concepts were drawn
from Clausewitz’s theories is obvious. They joined many Jominian concepts, such
as lines of operation and decisive points, which had long been in use.
American military theory was also influenced by European debates on the
potential and preferred use of mechanized formations, particularly with respect
to the use of the ‘wide envelopment’ and the ‘penetration and encirclement’ of
enemy forces as a prelude to achieving a battle of annihilation. In these ways,
American doctrine differed little from its European counterparts. Armoured
vehicles were in short supply, however, and while much is made of the German
use of cardboard tanks to compensate for the lack of real ones, such measures do
not reveal logistical and maintenance requirements, which are essential to under-
standing operational limitations. The major doctrinal differences were more
evident in that Americans put more emphasis on phased operations, and coordi-
nation between land and naval forces, and the air elements of both. Joint planning
and training for staff officers and commanders also improved throughout all
branches of the American military, with multi-service war games and training
exercises taking place on a more regular basis.
Historians have recently challenged the popular image that air power advocates
were struggling to advance new ideas against service parochialism and resistance
to change. Considerable evidence, in fact, suggests that the key leaders in the US
army, such as George C. Marshall, and in the US navy, such as William A. Moffett,
were receptive to exploring the capabilities of air power, and they clearly recog-
nized it would have an essential role in future warfare. 29 That is not to say there
was not prejudice against the new arm, particularly in an era in which budgets
were exceedingly small. In addition, the rapid development of civil aviation
within the United States, especially after 1930, helped create an environment
conducive to conceptual and technological innovation. There was, however, a
tendency on the part of air power enthusiasts to make bold claims with respect to
the anticipated accuracy and efficacy of long-range bombing, which was ad-
vanced as one sure way to avoid repeating the stalemate and high casualties of
trench warfare. These claims worked as a double-edged sword, creating expecta-
tions that would be impossible to meet and adding an air of unreality to the body
of theory as a whole.
The First World War revealed three key lessons: air superiority had to be
established before other air operations could take place, long-range bombing
held promise but was not particularly accurate, and aircraft had vital reconnais-
sance and close air support roles to play in surface operations. 30 Each of these
evolved into major roles and missions, which, in turn, pointed to the need for
different aircraft designs: pursuit, bombardment, and attack in the form of close
air support, respectively. Americanairoperational art during the inter-war years
American Operational Art, 1917–2008 143