forces were inexperienced and overly aggressive, falling for the German tactic
of baiting-and-running, inviting opposing armour to pursue into a screen of
anti-tank guns. The 2nd Corps attempted several counter-attacks with the 1st
Armored Division, but they were uncoordinated and too slow in unfolding.
American forces were driven back some fifty miles, and lost about 200 tanks;
3,000 men killed and wounded; and 3,700 prisoners. 44 However, conflicting
priorities within the Axis command prevented Rommel from exploiting the
victory by continuing his advance north-west to the supply bases at Tebessa,
and attempting to drive a wedge between Allied forces in Tunisia.
The encounter at Kasserine revealed that American operational art needed to
reform its grammar from the ground up. The US army assessed that its ‘basic
principles’ were sound, but that better all-arms cooperation was needed in
practice. 45 Among other things, the practice of ‘pooling’ tank, tank destroyer,
and anti-aircraft battalions at division level hindered the development of ‘coor-
dinated teamplay’ (cohesion and efficiency), which, in turn, limited American
operational effectiveness. 46 Communication problems also plagued coordination
between ground forces and aircraft, a combat-critical skill that was not given
sufficient attention during the inter-war years. In addition, the Americans
allowed the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the battle area, which in modern
warfare is unacceptable.
General George S. Patton III is credited with turning the performance of the US
2nd Corps around in a few short weeks, which he did, in part, by relieving
incompetent commanders, instilling discipline, and insisting on better planning
and coordination from his staff. He launched a successful counter-attack on
16–17 March against the rear of the Mareth Line, defeating several German
counter-attacks in the process; this success enabled Montgomery’s 8th Army to
sweep the Mareth Line from the east, dislodging the south-eastern flank of
German and Italian forces. The Allies pressed home their advantage, and the
campaign culminated two months later with Axis forces hemmed into a small
pocket in northern Tunisia, cut off from resupply, and deprived of air cover; some
275,000 German and Italian troops surrendered in a major victory for the Allies.
Patton achieved headline-grabbing victories in the Sicilian campaign a few
months later. His 7th Army was ordered to land along the Licata–Ragusa shore-
line, and drive north-west towards Palermo, shielding the right flank of Mon-
tgomery’s 8th Army from counter-attack. He did that and more. Within a
fortnight of landing, Patton had taken Palermo and swung east to advance on
Messina, entering the city on 16 August, a day ahead of Montgomery. He had
tried two minor amphibious assaults to outflank German positions, each of
which met with limited success. They would, however, become part of Allied
modus operandi in the campaign on the peninsula.
Despite the relatively rapid advances of the Americans and British, the Ger-
mans fell back in relatively good order, completing a complicated withdrawal
from Sicily to the Italian mainland across the Strait of Messina under cover of
darkness. By now, the commanders and staffs of the 7th Army had gained
valuable combat experience, at both amphibious operations and offensive
American Operational Art, 1917–2008 147