summer of 2003, the basic symptoms were essentially recognized by American
leaders, though not uniformly.
Still, the US military’s overall doctrine, training, and techniques were not geared
to conducting counter-insurgency operations, which had largely been abandoned
after El Salvador. The US military’s joint operations manual, JP 3-0, and its manual
for planning joint operations, JP 5-0, both describe the ‘essence of the operational
art’ as being able ‘to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and
purpose relative to a [center of gravity] to neutralize, weaken, defeat, or destroy
it’. 93 In other words, a fundamental transition, or relearning, had to occur, but the
initial approach, as doctrine indicated, was to treat counter-insurgency as simply
combat against irregular forces, which exacerbated the problem. 94
The search for appropriate methods eventually led to the rediscovery of classic
insurgency doctrine along the Maoist model. The result was FM 3-24Counterin-
surgency, produced jointly by the US army and US marine corps (MCWP 3-33.5),
which appeared in final form at the end of 2006. 95 The volume—which set
counter-insurgency operations within the framework of offensive, defensive,
stability, and support operations as established by FM 3.0 (2001)—has been
much criticized for addressing only the Maoist model, which it does, and for
not providing specific guidelines for how to win in Iraq, which clearly it does not.
Its principal writer claimed that the manual does not ‘de-emphasize combat
operations’, but rather that it stresses the importance of achieving legitimacy,
which requires the ability to accomplish ‘non-military operations, such as repair-
ing broken sewer lines and building relationships with the local people’. 96 Estab-
lishing legitimacy is part of the classic formula for defeating insurgencies;
however, legitimacy is culturally constructed, and thus achieved in different
ways. What seems to have worked in Iraq thus far—in conjunction with the
Surge, which more than anything demonstrated commitment—is that coalition
forces have encouraged some militias and insurgent groups to align themselves
against others, such as al-Qaeda. However, as always, such alignments remain
tentative. All political relationships are tentative.
American operational art continues to develop war’s second grammar with
energy. Its progress has been rapid, if uneven. British scholars and military profes-
sionals were once critical of the heavy-handed approach American military com-
manders took to counter-insurgency. Recent observations suggest that the situation
has reversed. 97 Still, operational doctrine is only a set of guidelines; it cannot cover
every situation. It may prove its worth simply by not getting in the way of efforts to
establish the kinds of political relationships necessary to secure peace.
CONCLUSIONOver the last century, American operational art has continuously improved the
concepts and methods by which it fights battles. In so doing, it assumed, as many
militaries have, that winning battles would lead, ultimately, to winning wars.
American Operational Art, 1917–2008 159