- Bernard Brodie,The Absolute Weapon(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).
- Robert E. Osgood,Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy(Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1957). - Thomas C. Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1966). - Herman Kahn,On Thermonuclear War(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1960);On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios(New York: Praeger, 1965). - I. D. Holder, ‘A New Day for Operational Art’, in R. L. Allen (ed.),Operational Level of
War—Its Art(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1985), 4–1, 4–2, underscores the
‘belief that nuclear weapons meant the end of conventional warfare’. - Harry G. Summers, Jr.,On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War(Novato,
CA: Presidio, 1982). - Shimon Naveh,In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
(London: Frank Cass, 1997), 263, describes it as ‘the longest, most intoxicating and
creative professional debate which ever occurred in the history of American military
thought’. - Department of the Army,FM 100-5 Operations, 20 August 1982 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1982), 2–1, 2–2; Swain, ‘Filling the Void’, 159; Allan English, ‘The Operational
Art’, in Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey
(eds.),The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts(Kingston,
ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005), 16. - English, ‘Operational Art’, 16.
- Naveh,Pursuit of Military Excellence, 292–5.
- Joint Publication,JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
(Washington, DC: 16 June 1995). - Cf. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note, dated 28 February
2006,http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm, accessed October 2009. - John Andreas Olsen,John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power
(Washington, DC: Potomac, 2007). - In brief, Warden maintained that strategic paralysis or psychological collapse would
result by attacking critical points in each of five ‘rings’ simultaneously: leadership,
organic or system essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded military forces.
John A. Warden III, ‘The Enemy as a System’,Airpower Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring
1995), 40–5. - Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh,The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy
and War in the New World Order(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991),
316–17. - Brigadier General John S. Brown, ‘The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm’, inHistorical Perspectives, 439–82. - Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Persian Gulf War (1991)’, ibid., 588.
- General Ronald Fogelman, USAF, ‘Airpower and the American Way of War’, speech
presented at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium, Orlando, Florida,
15 February 1996; cf. Grant T. Hammond, ‘The U.S. Air Force and the American Way
of War’, in Anthony D. McIvor (ed.),Rethinking the Principles of War(Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2005), 109–25. - Michael Ignatieff,Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond(New York: Metropolitan, 2000).
- Department of the Army,FM 100-5 Operations, 14 June 1993 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1993), 1–3. - Ibid., 1–4.
164 The Evolution of Operational Art