important milestones in the evolution of operational art: not only the flashes of
genius and intellectual apexes, but also the periods devoid of creative thinking;
not only successful campaigns, but also those that lacked appropriate theoretical
underpinnings or operational excellence. The historical record tracing the evolu-
tion of operational art can best be understood through studies that cover both
theory and practice. This book is intended to provide military professionals,
officer-scholars, and graduate students that wider framework and contextualiza-
tion of operational art by tracing its roots and development in various countries.
BRIEF SUMMARYThe book’s point of departure is the last decades of the eighteenth century. In
Chapter 1, Professor Martin van Creveld demonstrates that the emergence of
campaigns, made possible by a certain size of military formations, in essence
opened the way for the operational level of war, operational warfare, and opera-
tional art. The complexity of campaigns, especially those that took place along
broad fronts and covered large distances, accentuated the role of effective control,
which, in turn, brought into play a new dimension of warfare. The historical
factors that ushered the operational dimension into the world were the French
Revolution and theleve ́e en masse, and the man who presided over its birth was
Napoleon Bonaparte.
Professor van Creveld suggests that this revolution in military affairs was made
possible by three factors that owed very little to technology per se. First, thecorps
d’arme ́esystem ensured armies of a certain size, within which each corps could
operate under unified and central direction and therefore undertake unprece-
dented manoeuvres in terms of speed and range. Second, the imperial headquar-
ters ensured that the emperor received timely and relevant information in a
systematic fashion, and in turn provided the corps with a plan of campaign.
Third, the ‘directed telescope’ provided the link between the two, supplementing
information on the ground from ‘intelligent captains’ with assessments from
senior officers. The combination of these three factors, together with the genius
and energy of Napoleon, led to an outcome that represented ‘an increase, indeed,
almost an explosion, in the speed, extent, range, and flexibility of military
operations’. The author emphasizes that this outcome did not result from Napo-
leon having better or simply more information than his opponents, but from the
system he had put in place, which ensured that he and theGrande Arme ́e‘were
able to functionwithouthaving such information’.
In the next case study, Professor Dennis Showalter focuses on the rise and fall
of operational art in the Prussian-German context. For three decades, following
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in June 1815, Prussia assumed a rather low-key
position in Europe, viewing itself more as aKleinstaatthan as a great power. The
Second Industrial Revolution and the re-emergence of a French empire redefined
Prussia’s ambitions. Two significant military successes marked the Prussian
Introduction 3