increase in the hope of neutralizing its dependence on sequential concentrations of
forces. In the wake of the peace with Egypt and Jordan and the stable disengage-
ment agreement with Syria—which, virtually isolated, was left behind—the Israeli
siege mentality started to diminish.
On the other hand, the relatively convenient enemies of the past, who, time and
again, had demonstrated a lack of sophistication, imagination, boldness, and
cohesion, became much more sophisticated, both operationally and technologi-
cally. Egyptian post-1967 strategy was tailor-made for its real military capabilities.
The Palestinians have demonstrated flexibility in challenging Israel by alternately
using guerrilla tactics, terror, and civil disobedience, and Hezbollah’s fighters
have been highly motivated, well trained and equipped, and have used simple but
effective technology and psychological warfare, which no revolution in military
affairs (RMA)-inspired doctrine can cope with effectively. 32
Israeli fortifications along the Suez Canal after 1967 and its settlements along
and within the new post-1967 borders created a territorial reality that denied
strategic or operational depth. Only in the wake of the peace process with Egypt
did the Sinai again become a buffer zone, as it had been during the period
1957–67. Waves of Palestinian terror within the territories and the Green Line
have been another manifestation of the futility of Israeli dreams of strategic or
operational depth in the West Bank. Furthermore, transferring the war to the
enemy’s territory—as Israel did in 1956, 1967, and 1973—became almost irrele-
vant and even too risky in an LIC-dominated reality.
A combination of developments has taken the sting out of the IDF’s opera-
tional art. Influential, in particular, have been the LIC and the attritional nature
of the conflicts that have engaged Israel, the ascendancy of firepower over mano-
euvre, the cult of technology, post-heroic norms, the strengthening of linear
thinking, and commanders’ lack of real combat experience. These new conditions
and their impact on Israeli operational art will be elaborated below.
Conditions
The transition from HICs to LICs
The 1973 October War was the last purely HIC confrontation. Once Egypt opted
for peace, the likelihood of Arab–Israeli HICs decreased considerably. With the
growing terror challenges in the 1980s, LIC challenges have started being referred
to as a strategic threat to Israel, and Israeli military operations have been con-
ducted against non-state players (the limited confrontation with Syrian troops in
Lebanon in 1982 excluded). Paradoxically, the shift from HICs to LICs consti-
tuted a deterioration in the challenges confronting the IDF. In LICs, the manoeu-
vre, which is usually necessary for an operational and strategic decision, loses
much of its importance. The fear that capturing territory in future wars might
lead to another protracted war of attrition of an LIC nature channelled the IDF to
adopt an operational conception that focused on firepower rather than ground
178 The Evolution of Operational Art