place. On the other hand, the objectives of those engaged in such conflicts and
sometimes also the targets they choose to hit are beyond the direct battlefield at
the grand-strategic level; that is, the enemy’s society and economy. Tactical
achievements or failures are often directly translated into achievements or failures
at the grand-strategic level. This happens because the weaker side seeks to bypass
confrontation at the strategic and operational levels of war because it acknowl-
edges the stronger side’s edge at these levels. Israel has been experiencing this
reality since the late 1970s/early 1980s, both in the territories and from southern
Lebanon. Egypt started the 1969–70 War of Attrition based on the same logic,
except that, instead of attacking Israeli civilians directly, it assumed that the war
along the canal would indirectly weaken Israeli society and the economy, as a
result of the casualties and the economic price inflicted.
For their part, state players engaged in LICs or wars of attrition are some-
times tempted to take advantage of their operational and strategic superiority
for initiating large-scale operations in order to put an end to the weaker side’s
modus operandi. And indeed, after becoming easily frustrated by the elusiveness
of guerrillas and terrorists, Israel’s response to Palestinian terror from Lebanon in
the late 1970s/early 1980s included two large-scale operations—Operation Litani
(1978) and Peace for the Galilee ([1982], which later escalated into a war). In
2002, during the second intifada, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, a
large-scale operation in the West Bank. Against Hezbollah, the IDF launched
three large-scale operations—Accountability (1993), Grapes of Wrath (1996),
and Changing Direction ((2006), which later became the Second Lebanon
War). The effectiveness of these operations varied; some, for example Defensive
Shield and Changing Direction, had longer-term effectiveness, while the effect of
other operations proved to be limited or temporary. 37
The voices calling for crushing terror notwithstanding, both the IDF and the
political echelon eventually understood that, for coping with national uprisings
and terror, purely military skills would be insufficient. Instead, a multidimension-
al approach must be adopted that combines military and non-military means.
And, indeed, unlike most of its previous LICs, when it had merely been using
force, during the intifadas closures, sieges, and other measures aimed at the
enemy’s society and economy became part of the IDF’s modus operandi, proving
to be no less effective. For a military whose expertise was the employment of
violent means, this was a sobering experience.
This does not mean that non-military dimensions that have characterized
modern, not to mention postmodern, war have necessarily become an integral
part of operational art or should be treated as such. 38 Too broad an interpreta-
tion of operational art, which includes, for example, ‘consciousness-shaping
operations’—a concept spread by the OTRI against the backdrop of the second
intifada, 39 which was aimed at both the enemy’s and one’s own society—blurs the
distinction between operations and grand strategy. We have already witnessed
similar attempts to offer too broad a meaning to security, which have caused the
concept to lose much of its clarity. 40
180 The Evolution of Operational Art