The ascendancy of firepower over manoeuvre as a major impediment
The ascendancy of firepower over manoeuvre on the Arab–Israeli battlefield in
the post-1967 period was a result of technological changes that introduced to the
scene precise, long-range, and much more destructive weapon systems, and an
Arab effort to limit the IDF’s manoeuvrability, which the Arab countries consid-
ered the major reason for their defeat in the Six Day War.
From an Israeli perspective, strengthened firepower has had three negative
aspects. First, the increasing range and accuracy of modern weaponry have
created a battlefield density that limits the scope for manoeuvre no less than
the density stemming from the volume of force relative to space. 41 In the wake of
their defeat in 1967, Arab armies have focused their efforts on neutralizing the
freedom of action of Israeli armour and air power. 42 During the 1969–70 War of
Attrition, it became evident that technological developments were limiting Israeli
offensive capabilities. It seemed that, for the first time, the IAF was losing the
battle against the Egyptian and Soviet missile belt. 43 Shortly after the August 1970
ceasefire came into effect, the Soviets deployed missile batteries along the Suez
Canal. This was later referred to as the first practical Egyptian step towards the
1973 October War. 44
In 1972, Israeli military officials started warning that the Arabs already pos-
sessed thousands of anti-tank missiles, 45 and that every single kilometre of the
front was covered by dense Arab fire, consisting of large quantities of anti-tank
weapons of various types, many of which were cheap and simple, and some 20
tanks, 2,000 anti-tank mines, 150–200 artillery guns, and other automatic weap-
ons. 46 In the air, aptly described as a ‘Maginot Line in the sky’, a combined anti-
aircraft system—consisting of SAM-2s, SAM-3s, SAM-6s, SAM-7s, and guns, the
most effective of which was the ZPU-23–4—posed a serious threat to the IAF. The
various components of this anti-aircraft system complemented each other in terms
of range and altitude, thereby creating a very difficult-to-penetrate wall of fire. 47
These developments were reflected in the heavy losses inflicted on the IAF during
the initial stages of the 1973 October War. As the war started with an Arab initiative
and the Israelis were caught by surprise, the IAF, instead of destroying Arab surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) before carrying out tactical missions on the battlefield, as
required by its doctrine, was forced to reverse the sequence. The result was that most
of the IAF’s losses were caused by anti-aircraft weapon systems.
On the ground, Israeli tanks arrived at the front from the rear in small bursts.
Instead of being operated in armour fists, as armoured warfare requires, they were
thrown into battle in a dispersed manner, becoming easy prey for anti-tank
hunters. By 14 October, the IDF had lost some 500 tanks on the Egyptian Front.
At least 25 per cent of the attrition suffered by the Israeli-armoured corps was
inflicted by anti-tank weapon systems, mostly Sagger missiles and rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs). 48 The attrition rates in 1973, however, were lower than the ones
in 1967—23 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively—the reason being the IDF’s
tactical flexibility in coping with surprise and the resourcefulness of its comman-
ders. Not only did Israeli tank crews apply new tactics for evading anti-tank
The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 181