The positive aspects have, in recent years, been reflected in a new Israeli
operational conception, which stipulates that firepower and the aerial dimension
in general and stand-off fire in particular play a central role on the battlefield,
decreasing friction, making traditional large-scale and deep ground manoeuvres
as well as the capture of enemy territory much less necessary, if not obsolete, and
avoiding the price entailed by a protracted presence in hostile territory. 55
Post-heroic warfare and its repercussions
Another factor that has strongly worked against ground manoeuvres is the post-
heroic state of mind that took hold of Israeli military operations from the late
1970s. Post-heroic warfare has two major rules: first, one is not allowed to get
killed 56 ; second, one is not allowed to kill enemy civilians. The explanation for the
Israeli post-heroic attitude seems to be threefold: technological developments, the
liberal-democratic values of the country, and the non-existential nature of LICs.
The IDF demonstrated early signs of adhering to the first rule of post-heroic
warfare during the 1978 Litani operation against the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO) on the Lebanese border, when it preferred using massive fire at the
expense of quick manoeuvring on the ground in order to avoid or at least reduce
its troop casualties. 57 During Operations Accountability (1993) and Grapes of
Wrath (1996), Israel preferred responding to Hezbollah’s high-trajectory fire by
firepower rather than manoeuvre. It managed to maintain its presence in Leba-
non for more than twenty years—from 1978 to 2000—thanks to the fact that the
number of soldiers killed in battle, some twenty-five a year, was sustainable. A
shift, however, started taking place after post-heroic warfare’s first rule—avoid
your own troop casualties—was broken in February 1997 when a helicopter crash
over the Galilee claimed the lives of seventy-three Israeli troops on their way to
Lebanon, and the casualties inflicted on Israeli troops in Wadi Saluki in August
1997 (five soldiers) and during the September 1997 elite commando unit operation
in southern Lebanon (twelve soldiers). In 1999, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz admitted
that the IDF was now relying on air activity against Hezbollah, rather than activities
on the ground, so as to reduce Israeli casualties. 58 In 1996, the second rule was
violated, when during Operation Grapes of Wrath some 100 Lebanese civilians were
inadvertently killed by Israeli fire, which prompted a halt to the entire operation.
After 1997, the voices calling for a withdrawal from southern Lebanon, spearheaded
by the anti-war Four Mothers movement, were listened to attentively, and the door
for the 2000 withdrawal was opened.
Likewise, during the intifadas, Israel behaved post-heroically. Engagement
regulations were adapted so as to provide Israeli troops with the tools to cope
with situations where unarmed civilians were involved. 59 The IDF also developed
and used non-lethal and less lethal weapons. Since the mid-1990s, Research and
Development (R&D) units in the Israeli Defence Ministry have focused on
developing technologies to be used in asymmetric conflicts, whose main purpose
is to increase the combat effectiveness of Israeli troops while reducing troop
and enemy civilian casualties. 60 Israeli fighting tactics were also adapted to
The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 183