post-heroic warfare’s rules. Notwithstanding the suicide bombings of the second
intifada, Israel made an effort to uphold post-heroic warfare’s second rule. Even
targeted killings, which became a major counter-terror method, were compatible
with the notion of discriminate use of force, with the number of innocent
civilians killed during these actions dropping consistently over the years. 61
The commitment to post-heroic warfare also cast its shadow over the Second
Lebanon War, this time with a negative effect on Israeli operational effective-
ness. According to an operational plan (Country Shield), which was prepared a
few years before the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War, the IDF was sup-
posed to take control of southern Lebanon from the Litani River south (the
‘hammer’) and from the Lebanon–Israel border north (the ‘anvil’). This initial
stage was to be followed by a two-week stage of controlling the territory via fire
and small units. A six-week period seemed to be sufficient for neutralizing the
Katyusha threat by hunting as many launchers as possible. Once completed,
the IDF troops were to disengage and return to Israel. Bearing in mind Israeli
society’s loss aversion, Country Shield’s planners aimed at crippling Hezbollah
with minimal Israeli casualties. 62 The IDF also prepared an alternative plan (Ice
Breaker), which tried to avoid a large-scale ground manoeuvre and focused on
stand-off fire. 63
When the war started, even the relatively moderate Country Shield plan was
considered by the political and military echelons to be too costly. In cabinet
meetings during the war, ministers warned against a ground operation due to its
death toll. 64 Throughout the war, IAF fighter-bombers flew at high altitude
in order to avoid pilot casualties. 65 Every casualty was reported to the chief of
staff, and there was a case in which an entire battle was stopped because of one
casualty. 66 An investigation committee, headed by General (ret.) Yoram Yair,
found that, during the war, commanders’ sense of responsibility for the lives of
their troops overshadowed their commitment to fulfil their missions. Chief of
Staff Dan Halutz admitted that a ‘no-casualties’ approach penetrated the Israeli
military mentality as a result of the IDF’s preoccupation with terror challenges. 67
The decline of the IDF’s traditional force multipliers
Once technology impinged on the IDF’s force build-up and military operations,
operational art was the first to pay the price. Former director of the research and
development directorate at the Ministry of Defence, General Isaac Ben-Israel,
advocated a technology-focused military doctrine, force design, and build-up,
identifying military quality with hi-tech capabilities. 68 Similar views have been
expressed by other Israeli military experts, such as Shmuel Gordon, who preached
a fire-based substitute for Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. 69
And, indeed, each of Israel’s traditional force multipliers has been affected by
technological developments, particularly by the ascendancy of firepower over
manoeuvre, as described below.
184 The Evolution of Operational Art