as centre of gravity, which have united military thinkers and practitioners for
centuries, except for the dilemma of where and against what it would be best to
concentrate forces or fire in order to achieve a battlefield decision. 78
Whereas EBO is not necessarily manoeuvre-based, as it can also count on
shock and awe, ‘swarming’, that is coordinated attacks from different directions
by small, dispersed, and networked units—another American concept that
has also been enthusiastically embraced by the IDF—is manoeuvre-oriented. 79
Although it does reflect an intention to concentrate force, it seems to be alien to
the notion of amassing as much force as necessary, against either a point of
strength or a point of weakness, in the spirit of centre of gravity.Lower likelihood of first strike and blitzkrieg
A basic problem Israel had to cope with when it planned a first strike was the time
period required for mobilizing and deploying sufficient ground forces to that
end. Considerably enhanced firepower capabilities have the potential to launch a
first strike without exposing the preparations for it. Another positive develop-
ment entailed in the significant strengthening of firepower capabilities is the
option of near-real-time retaliation, which becomes relevant in case of a surprise
attack or political constraints that make the launching of a first strike impossible.
On the other hand, in a reality where weapons have longer ranges and are much
more precise and destructive, the destruction inflicted as a result of absorbing the
enemy’s first strike might be even greater than before.
As forblitzkrieg, since the 1970s it has become a less-plausible option because it
has required open spaces for manoeuvre—a rare resource in a reality of a
saturated battlefield. This explains why in recent years the IDF has reorganized
logistically, adopting a more centralized system, which is based on modularly
structured area-logistics units. 80 During the Second Lebanon War, however, it
became clear that the system may have improved control over logistical resources
and may have saved manpower and stocks, 81 but at the same time it crippled the
combat units’ logistical autonomy and countered operational art’s logic and
spirit. It is doubtful whether it would have met operational requirements had
the war involved large-scale ground manoeuvres.
Where have the great captains gone?
Ironically, while greater efforts have been made by the IDF in order to offer
commanders better formal education and training, its operational art has been
deteriorating, manifesting its weakness time and again.
Israeli technology-focused military thinking has produced a new species of
commanders with blunted operational-art senses. IDF commanders have, in
recent years, been suffering from two main problems. First, the technological
age only strengthened their basic inclination to think in terms of technological
force multipliers, such as smart weapons, rather than in terms of force multipliers188 The Evolution of Operational Art