fight these wars, inevitably it would find itself confronted by a far more potent
military adversary. Then, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the PLA
tweaked its doctrine to recognize what was regarded as the revolution within a
revolution. The core of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) for
Chinese soldiers was a revolution in information technology. Hence, as they
look towards the second decade of the twenty-first century, China’s armed forces
are preparing to fight ‘local wars under informatized conditions’. Thus, the PLA is
striving to employ technology and information operations to counter a foe’s
asymmetric advantages rather than to attain pre-eminence for itself in those areas.
HALLMARKS OF THE CHINESE OPERATIONAL ARTHallmarks of China’s operational art have been identified. Frequently, Chinese
operational art is depicted as emphasizing alternatives to the direct application of
military force in a given situation. This image includes the contention that
Chinese strategists and commanders prefer unorthodox approaches to direct
force-on-force combat on the battlefield. This image also includes the presumption
that Chinese generals have an ingrained preference for defensive operations rather
than offensive measures. Moreover, some contend that the Chinese are disposed to
positional warfare, although others insist the Chinese are more disposed to mobile
operations. And still others claim that the Chinese stress that man is the decisive
element in war and downplay technology. Furthermore, some argue that the
Chinese evaluate battlefield success differently from non-Chinese. 21 Discussion of
these hallmarks will be attempted with reference both to the writings of Chinese
strategic thinkers and to the actual performance of Chinese military forces on the
battlefield in the ancient and modern eras.
An analysis of the record reveals that successful Chinese generals have selected
both orthodox and unorthodox methods in warfare, as well as are seeking a balance
between the above-mentioned dichotomies. As Mao noted in December 1936:
‘The problems of strategy include the following....Giving proper consideration
to the distinction...between concentration and dispersion [of forces], between
attack and defence...between concealment and exposure...between positional
war and mobile war...between military work and political work...’. 22
Orthodox and unorthodox
One important theme running through the writings of theorists from Sun Zi to
the present day is the use of two kinds of strategies—orthodox and unorthodox.
The former term in Chinese uses the character ‘zheng’, while the latter uses the
term ‘qi’. Orthodox refers to conventional and direct strategies, such as frontal
assaults. Unorthodox refers to unconventional and indirect approaches, such as
attacking in an unexpected way from an unexpected direction (i.e. from the
The Chinese Way of War 201