traditionally based. Third, the post-heroic state of mind that has characterized
Israeli society and its political and military echelons since the late 1970s has also
de-emphasized the significance of manoeuvre.
By establishing the Operational Theory Research Institute in 1995, Israel
sought to overcome this decline. The institute was touted as a renaissance for
operational art, but Kober maintains that the effort failed miserably because it
created a postmodern theoretical construct and terminology that few could
understand and relate to. Furthermore, in terms of leadership training the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) focused more on equipping commanders with managerial
skills than on grooming great captains. The inadequate professional training of
IDF commanders—for reasons Kober explains in his chapter—has prevented
commanders from becoming familiar with the best theoretical materials on
classical and modern military theory in general and operational art in particular.
Kober concludes that Israel’s return to a high standard of operational art will
depend on getting back to the basics of military thinking, and on a military
leadership that understands the value of a higher standard of professional educa-
tion and training.
In Chapter 7, Dr Andrew Scobell examines the Chinese way of war, focusing on
the rise of the Communist movement in the 1920s and the founding of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949. However, he suggests that key elements of operational
art have been at the heart of the Chinese form of war for centuries. Furthermore,
while the Chinese strategic tradition contains distinctive cultural elements, it
exhibits greater commonalities with other traditions than are often recognized,
especially when one looks beyond written texts and at the actual conduct of
operations. Drawing on the writings of Sun Tzu, Zhuge Liang, and Mao Zedong,
and on contemporary doctrines and experiences from both conventional war and
guerrilla warfare, Scobell identifies the hallmarks of China’s operational art as the
combination of orthodox and unorthodox elements, a mixture of human factors
and technology, and a blend of offensive and defensive priorities, as well as mobile
and positional warfare. In addition, Chinese forces sometimes fight for show,
sometimes for military victory, and sometimes for both.
In Scobell’s view, since modern Chinese operational art sees these character-
istics asyinandyangrather than as absolutes, it resembles Western thinking more
than the school of ‘Chinese uniqueness’ suggests. This is especially true at a time
when China’s armed forces seek to become both combined and joint so that they
can potentially deal with the full spectrum of armed conflict: from war for
national survival to peace operations abroad to local disturbances. While opera-
tional thought in Europe and the United States has been characterized by high
and low points, the Chinese have been relatively consistent at keeping the tenets
of operational art alive, both in theory and in practice.
Finally, in the Epilogue, General Sir Rupert Smith argues that we have moved
from ‘industrial war’ to ‘war amongst the people’ emphasizing that this change of
paradigms has strong implications for the operational artist and his or her
practice of operational art. Collectively, these chapters describe how the concepts
that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression
Introduction 7