instance was a desire for the countries concerned to take China more seriously.
Because Beijing believed it was perceived as weaker or less militarily prepared by
each adversary, foremost in the minds of Chinese leaders was driving home the
point that China must be taken seriously. The PLAwould not back away from a fight.
In none of these three combat operations was the purpose to seize and hold territory.
Rather, Chinese forces attacked their adversaries in sharp and bloody engagements
before eventually withdrawing from the disputed terrain.
Meanwhile, war fighting against the KMT forces on offshore islands in the
Taiwan Strait during the early 1950s was a different story. Although these opera-
tions were certainly full of symbolism—demonstrating the CCP’s intent to
complete the unification of China and show unwavering commitment to achieve
total victory against the Nationalists—the goal of these operations was the actual
capture of selected offshore islands. Thus, the propaganda from Mao about
Beijing allowing the KMT to hold these islands as part of a shrewd ‘noose
strategy’ to allow Beijing to exert pressure on Chiang Kai-shek and maintain
links between the mainland and Taiwan was anex post factorationale to cope with
operational failure. By the late 1950s, Mao had given up on success on the
battlefield and began in earnest to manipulate hostilities against the offshore
islands for propaganda and political theatre. 70
The 1995–6 Taiwan Strait crisis is best classified as a ‘show of force’ in which
Beijing engaged in sabre-rattling to warn Taipei and Washington that China was
seriously upset with the actions of both. The show was also an effort on the part
of top political leader Jiang Zemin to assuage the PLA and the Chinese people,
who were irate at what was widely perceived as the traitorous acts of Taiwanese
authorities and the perfidy of the United States. The missile tests off the coast of
Taiwan and the military exercises in late 1995 and early 1996 were calibrated to
send messages to each audience. 71
It must be stressed that, while symbolism and propaganda are important hall-
marks of Chinese Communist warfare, so too are battles of annihilation. The PRC
has not demonstrated any reluctance to use force when it is deemed necessary.
Official pronouncements and doctrinal writings insist China only employs mili-
tary means as a last resort. However, once a decision to conduct military opera-
tions has been made, there seems to be no turning back. Beijing has demonstrated
a pattern of verbal warnings in the lead-up to employing military power discern-
ible in cases such as Korea and India. 72 These verbal blasts have been read as signals
of deterrence to be heeded by the adversary. Instead of being aimed at making the
use of actual force unnecessary, this rhetoric appears to serve the purpose of
rationalizing in Chinese minds that they had made every effort to use peaceful
means before resorting to force. Moreover, the use of operational pauses has been
interpreted by analysts as signalling a desire for negotiation; however, upon closer
examination, these moves seem to have no strategic-level deterrent or compellence
function, but are simply opportunities intended for Chinese forces to regroup and
prepare for the next offensive. In Korea, for example, the break-off of contact by
Chinese forces in November 1950 was not to signal restraint and a lost opportunity
that the United States failed to read correctly at the time; rather, it was so that the
214 The Evolution of Operational Art