CPV could prepare for the next campaign. Beijing had decided that its strategic
goal was the occupation of the entire Korean Peninsula and the operational goal
was to sweep southwards all the way to Pusan. 73
In Chinese conflicts since 1949 we have witnessed the carefully calibrated use of
force, but these operations entailed significant calculated risks. While Beijing
clearly intended in each case to keep the war limited, all of these instances entailed
considerable risk of escalation. In the final analysis, while the Chinese believe they
have used military force sparingly, in practice they have demonstrated little
hesitation to use the repeated application of force, as deemed necessary. 74 The
PLA has traditionally sought to concentrate superior numbers on a specific
enemy force, isolate it, and attempt to annihilate the force. 75 These characteristics
are evident in Chinese operations in Korea, India, and Vietnam. However, for the
PRC, the ultimate criterion of victory is not operational success but geostrategic
advantage. 76 Beijing’s goal is not so much capturing territory or inflicting casual-
ties and destruction on the enemy, but rather to make a larger point. This point
can include demonstrating resolve to others and/or the Chinese people.
CONCLUSIONChinese operational art is a combination of orthodox and unorthodox elements,
a mixture of man and technology, a blend of offence and defence, as well as
mobile and positional warfare. At times, Chinese soldiers are fighting for show; at
times, they are fighting for military victory, and, at other times, for both. These
dimensions are not merely evident in contemporary China but in earlier eras as
well. How distinct is Chinese operational art compared to the operational arts of
other countries? The above-mentioned hallmarks can be found in the operational
manuals, strategic tomes, and military histories of other countries, as well as in
practice on the fields of battle, although perhaps combined in somewhat different
measures and variations. Nevertheless, the putative differences may be less evi-
dent in the actual practice of the operational art than they are often imagined to
be. Moreover, these differences may be manifested more at the higher levels of
strategy than at the operational level. It does seem clear that there are cultural
distinctions in the way strategic thinkers approach matters of war and peace—
beliefs about the efficacy of military force, and assumptions about their own
strategic traditions. Certainly, Chinese strategists firmly believe this is so. 77 But
whether these beliefs translate into real differences in how China’s military
conducts operations relative to the armed forces of other states cannot be
answered conclusively in this short chapter.
How effective is Chinese operational art in the twenty-first century? There has
been no major war since 1979 to show conclusively the state of the art. However,
one can look at evolving PLA doctrine, performance in peacekeeping operations
(PKOs), and execution in military exercises conducted in recent years, as well as
the PLA’s response to domestic crises, such as the popular protests of 1989, and
The Chinese Way of War 215