desired end state and the best way to achieve it. Yet, to state the obvious, ‘every
war must end’, and success in warfare is determined by that ending. Second, as
these case studies show, operational success depends on a plan that is logistically
feasible. Logistical considerations must be an integral part of any plan of
campaign, since the logistical component of the operation ensures sustainabil-
ity. Many campaigns throughout history have failed simply because of logistical
over-stretch.
This book’s point of reference is campaigns, and these campaigns have
typically been large-scale operations. But wars from the time of Napoleon to
the end of the Second World War differ from the wars currently being fought in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In today’s world, insurgency and counter-insurgency
have become the most common and, in many ways, most important forms of
war—far more common than regular warfare between nation states. The rela-
tive infrequency of large-scale operations and the prevalence of smaller ones,
often irregular and ‘unruly’ in nature, and often without the classic rear and
front lines, have led analysts to question the current and future relevance of
operational art.
While such scepticism is understandable, operational art is and will remain an
important element in the cognitive process of planning and conducting cam-
paigns, whether they target regular forces or insurgents. Just as the aim, scale, and
scope of today’s campaign plans differ from those seen in the days of Napoleon,
so the aim, scale, and scope of operational art must change to reflect current
realities. Hence, the appropriate question is not whether operational art is
relevant to the future, but rather how we—theorists and practitioners alike—
can make operational art relevant to the challenges at hand. It is easy to dismiss
operational art aspasse ́; it is more difficult, but far more interesting and useful, to
make it applicable to today’s and tomorrow’s operations.
In accepting thatthe times they are a-changin’it is important to recognize new
features that demand new responses. Dr Antulio Echevarria offers a useful
distinction when he refers to war’s ‘first grammar’—the principles and proce-
dures related to defeating an opponent by armed force—compared to war’s
‘second grammar’—the handling of insurgents, guerrillas, partisans, terrorists,
and various forms of irregular warfare. General Sir Rupert Smith makes a similar
distinction when he asserts that ‘war amongst the people’ has replaced tradition-
al industrial war. In the epilogue to this book, he suggests that the new paradigm
is best characterized by an ebb and flow between confrontation and conflict,
where the objectives for military forces are no longer ‘take, hold, destroy, defeat,’
but, for example, ‘create a safe and secure environment’. Under the old paradigm,
the objective was to destroy the opponent; under the new paradigm, the objective
is to alter the opponent’s intentions. Where the old paradigm considered mili-
tary force supreme, the new accords equal importance to diplomatic, political,
economic, social, and legal measures.
In describing the trends that distinguish the new paradigm from industrial
war, Sir Rupert suggests that success in operational art will require changes in
mindsets as well as in military institutions, structures, and processes, as all are
Conclusion 223