prohibitively expensive. Perhaps surprisingly, from the moment telescopesdid
become available to the time they were used for the purpose about a century and
a half had to pass.
The net of optical telegraph lines that France started building in 1794 is known
as the Chappe system, after the brothers who invented it. 22 It consisted of a series
of towers, each so situated as to be visible from the ones adjacent to it on both
sides. Some of the towers made use of existing structures, such as church spires,
whereas others were specially constructed. Each tower was staffed by two men, a
receiver and a transmitter. Each one was surmounted by a large movable beam
with a shorter beam, also pivoted and movable, attached to each of its ends. The
beams were attached to ropes, which were worked from inside the tower, enabling
them to be set into 196 different positions representing different letters, words, or
even entire phrases. Messages could be transmitted eitheren clairor in code, by
day or by night (when the beams were illuminated). Depending on the weather
and also on the length of each message (the shorter the message, the faster it could
be transmitted), speeds of up to 250 miles per day could be achieved. At first,
there was just one line that led from Paris towards the Pas de Calais, its function
being to warn of a possible British landing. Under Napoleon, several others were
built, radiating from the capital towards Germany and Italy.
In the summer of 1809, it was the telegraph that warned Napoleon that the
Austrians had invaded Bavaria. This marked the opening move of the wars of the
Fourth Coalition. It enabled the emperor, who was in Paris, to alert his forces,
which were scattered over much of Germany, thus laying the foundation for what
turned into perhaps the greatest strategic masterpiece of his entire career. We,
however, are interested in the operational level; that is, the one where armies, or
part of armies, manoeuvre against each other in the field. At this level, the optical
telegraph, being immobile in space, had even less to offer than the electrical one
that followed it. An attempt to organize mobile signalling towers mounted on
carts came to nothing. All this goes far to show that, although there had been
some technical progress, its extent was rather limited. It cannot really explain the
invention of operational art that Napoleon wrought.
Napoleon himself was a phenomenonsui generis; one of those compact men
who seem so energetic that, had an electric bulb been thrust into their mouth, it
would have lit up. His nerves were outstanding—cases are on record when he
spent the last hours before ‘one of those tremendous battles on which the fate of
countries, peoples and crowns depends’, as he put it, fast asleep. By nature, he was
an optimist, always believing in his own star and that things would turn out well
in the end. A commander, indeed, cannot afford to behave in any other way.
Combined with an encyclopedic memory for faces as well as considerable verbal
and theatrical gifts, these qualities enabled him, time after time, to create a
situation where men fought to the death for him, cheering.
On a campaign, this prodigy would spend the night wherever was convenient.
Normally, this would be some country house that had been set apart for him
ahead of time (complete with a willing woman to entertain him). If necessary,
however, he would sleep in a tent or bivouac on the ground. He only slept four or
Napoleon and the Dawn of Operational Warfare 17