The Prussian army of the Wars of Liberation remained more the force of a
GermanKleinstaatthan of a great power. The increasing tendency towards mass
that characterized its tactics from Dresden to Waterloo in good part reflected
limited ability at brigade and battalion levels to execute the sophisticated combi-
nation punches of a tactical concept designed to maximize the effectiveness of a
numerically limited force. 12 And in a wider context, Prussia in 1813 became part
of an alliance whose sheer size combined with its fear of Napoleon to produce a
simulacrum of operational thinking: evade the emperor and advance where he
was not. But mutual mistrust, bad staff work, and simple lack of vision prevented
anything like a coherent theatre-level planning. 13
The army of 1813–15 might not have matched its Frederickian predecessor in
size or effectiveness. It was at the top of the list in fighting spirit. Its tone was set in
allied councils by Marshal Gebhard von Blu ̈cher, a fierce old soldier whose
character and behaviour harked back to the Thirty Years War. He knew only
one way of making war: fight without let-up. Prussian diplomacy followed a
similar line. It was Prussia that took a consistent lead in demanding action in the
months after Leipzig. It was Prussia that successfully reminded the Fourth
Coalition that peace was contingent on victory, and victory meant Napoleon’s
removal. 14 During the Hundred Days it was Prussia, personified once more by
Blu ̈cher, pulling the Duke of Wellington’s chestnuts from the fire of Waterloo and
transforming ‘a damned near-run thing’ into a decisive victory. 15
What these achievements had in common is that none of them had anything to
do with operational art except in retrospect. Prussia’s post-war army was no less
tactically oriented. Its order of battle totalled just over 100 infantry battalions.
About the same size as its Frederickian predecessor, it was no numerical match for
post-Napoleonic French and Austrian armies that each had over 250 battalions,
to say nothing of a tsarist Russia that counted over 700. Even the post-war British
army, starved of funds and hidden away in the far corners of the empire, stabilized
at around 100 battalions.
That reflected a synergy of economic limitations and diplomatic moderation.
For three decades after Waterloo, Prussia consciously assumed a facilitator’s role
in the Concert of Europe, the Holy Alliance of the three eastern empires, and the
German Confederation. It would take a second European revolution, the re-
emergence of a French empire, and a near-tectonic shift in Austria’s German
policy for Prussia to redefine its position. 16
THE GENESIS: THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
AND HELMUTH VON MOLTKEThat redefinition marked the emergence of operational art in the Prussian army.
Its emergence was a breech birth; the midwife was Helmuth von Moltke. Clau-
sewitz is credited with making a clear distinction between strategy and tactics.
38 The Evolution of Operational Art