in Germany is that tanks were added to existing doctrines and embryonic
force structures that stressed not only the combination, but also the synergy, of
mobility and striking power. The manoeuvres of 1932 featured a defending force
with two cavalry divisions and only a single infantry division. Red, the invaders,
included an entire cavalry corps, with cyclists and motorcyclists, motorized artillery,
and motorized reconnaissance elements. The combat vehicles and the motorized
formations were almost all simulated. Results were mixed, particularly when horses
and motor vehicles attempted to cooperate directly. But the speed and scope of
the exercises impressed all observers. Some motorized units advanced 300 kilo-
metres in three days—a pace unmatched since the Mongol invasions of the Middle
Ages. 62
Myths to the contrary, Adolf Hitler had far less to do with the creation of the
German armoured force than the army high command. In 1934, the motor
battalions furnished cadres for anti-tank and reconnaissance battalions. The 1st
and 2nd Cavalry Divisions took delivery of several hundred motor vehicles. The
3rd traded in its horses altogether and provided the nucleus for the ‘experimental
armoured division’ whose table of organization was issued in October 1934.
Like all of its successors, the 1st Panzer Division was conceptualized as a
balanced combined-arms force. Tanks and motorized infantry, motorcyclists
and armoured cars, artillery, engineers, and signals would train and fight together
at a pace set by the armour. The panzer division was seen as able to break into an
enemy position, break through, and break out with its own resources, thereby
solving the fundamental German problem of the First World War. But the panzer
division was also able to create opportunities on an enemy flank or in his rear
areas. It was able to conduct pursuit, and turn pursuit into exploitation. It could
discover opportunities with its reconnaissance elements, capture objectives with
its tanks, hold them with its infantry, then regroup and repeat the performance
100 kilometres away. 63
There was nothing unique in the panzer divisions’ tables of organization.
France had its very similar light mechanized divisions. Polish mobilization
plans projected mobile for ‘mixed divisions’. In the course of the decade, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria would collect their respective tank and
motorized elements into ad hoc ‘fast divisions’.
These reflected available forces rather than any real doctrine. But the German
stress on mobility, deep penetration, envelopment, and initiative was original. It
institutionalized and reinforced the concept that future campaigns would be
decided at neither tactical nor strategic levels, but in the intermediate sphere of
operations. In June 1935, Chief of Staff Ludwig Beck concluded a staff ride by
asserting that once an enemy front was broken armoured formations could
operate effectively, perhaps decisively, on enemy flanks and in the rear areas.
The next year, another staff exercise was built around the employment of an
entire armoured army. Not only were more panzer divisions organized, but corps
headquarters as well—and a separate inspection, or branch, to represent the
panzers’ interests in the shark tank that was the Third Reich’s rearmament
programme. 64
50 The Evolution of Operational Art