109–33; and Hermann Rahne, Mobilmachung (East Berlin: Milita ̈rverlag der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1983), 52ff., are good modern overviews.
- Moltke’s campaign plan for 1870 has been the subject of near-theological exegesis. His
‘Erste Aufstellung der Armee’, begun in the winter of 1868–9 and most recently
reworked in July 1870, is inMilita ̈rische Werke, 1, III, 114ff. Cf. the memo of 6 May
1870 in ibid., 131ff. The quotation is on p. 132. Among the many analyses, Bradley J.
Meyer, ‘The Operational Art: The Elder Moltke’s Campaign Plan for the Franco-
Prussian War’, inThe Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B. J.
C. McKercher and M. Hennessy (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), 29–49; Kessel,
Moltke, 538ff., and Arden Bucholz,Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871(New
York: Palgrave, 2001), 155ff., stand out for perception and clarity.
- Terence Zuber,The Moltke Myth: German War Planning, 1857–1871(Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 2008), 209ff.
- Michael Howard,The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France,
1870–1871(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1960), continues to set the standard for the
following events. Cf. Showalter,Wars of German Unification, 250ff. Geoffrey Wawro,
The Franco-Prussian War(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), has a
stronger French perspective.
- David Ascoli,A Day of Battle: Mars-la-Tour, 16 August 1870(London: Harrap, 1987), is
a model case study. The still-improvised nature of the concept ofAuftragstaktikin
1870 is highlighted in Stephan Leistenschneider,Auftragstaktik im preussisch-deutschen
Heer 1871 bis 1914(Hamburg: Mittler, 2002), 47–55.
- Kessel,Moltke, 562ff.
- ‘Aufsatz vom Jahre 1871 “U ̈ber Strategie”’,Milita ̈rische Werke, Abt. 2, vol. 2, 287ff.
- Michael D. Krause, ‘Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War’, in
Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke, 141–64, takes the story forward nicely. Cf. also
Carl-Gero von Ilsemann, ‘Das operative Denken des A ̈lteren Moltkes’, inOperatives
Denken und Handeln in deutschen Streitkra ̈ften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. MGFAS
(Herford: Mittler, 1988), 17–44; and Stig Fo ̈rster, ‘Facing “People’s War”: Moltke the
Elder and Germany’s Military Options after 1871’,Journal of Strategic Studies,11
(1988), 209–30.
- Cf. Antulio Echevarria,After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great
War(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 188–97; and Lothar Burchardt,
‘Operatives Denken und Planen von Schlieffen bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges’,
inOperatives Denken und Handeln,45–71.
- Gregor Schollgen,Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und der
orientalischen Frage, 1871–1914(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984); and Peter Winzen,
Bu ̈lows Weltmachtkonzept. Untersuchungen zur Fru ̈hphase seiner ußenpolitik 1897–1901
(Boppard: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1974).
- Dennis E. Showalter,Tannenberg: Clash of Empires(Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1991), 30ff.
- Eric Dorn Brose,The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology during the
Machine Age, 1870–1918(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 73ff.
- This seems to be the emerging consensus of years of debate on the major controversy
initiated by Terence Zuber, so intense it generated an international conference and
a major publication. Cf. Terence Zuber,Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War
Planning, 1871–1914(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and H. Ehlert,
M. Epkenhans and G. Gross (eds.),Der Schlieffenplan. Analyse und Dokumente(Pader-
60 The Evolution of Operational Art
