born: Scho ̈ningh, 2006), especially Gerhard P. Gross, ‘There Was a Schlieffen Plan.
Neue Quellen’, 117–60.
- Stig Fo ̈rster, ‘Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des ku ̈rzeren Krieges
1871–1914: Meatkritik eines mythos’,Milita ̈rgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 54 (1995),
61–96.
- The Hentsch Mission is the primary example. See Bradley J. Meyer, ‘Operational Art
and the German Command System in World War I’, Ph.D. dissertation (Ohio State
University, 1988).
- Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Prussian Cavalry, 1806–1871: The Search for Roles’,Milita ̈r-
geschichtliche Mitteilungen,19 (1976), 7–22.
- Maximilian von Poseck, The German Cavalry in 1914 in Belgium and France, ed.
J. Howe et al. (Berlin: Mittler, 1923), is a narrative overview; Roman Jarymowycz,
Cavalry from Hoof to Track(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008),
130ff., highlights operational shortcomings.
- These points are developed in R. L. Di Nardo’s forthcoming study of Gorlice–Tarnow.
I am grateful to the author for making his preliminary chapter drafts available.
- Laszlo M. Alfoeldi, ‘The Huitier Legend’,Parameters, 5 (1976), 69–74.
- Ernst Kabisch,Der Ruma ̈nienkrieg 1916(Berlin: Vorhut Verlag, 1938).
- David Zabecki,Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmu ̈ller and the Birth of Modern Artillery
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).
- Bruce Gudmundsson,Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989).
- Cf. David Zabecki’s conceptually focusedThe German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in
the Operational Level of War(New York: Routledge, 2008) and the general analysis of
the campaign and its problems, Martin Kitchen,The German Offensives of 1918
(Stroud: Tempus, 2001).
- Michael Geyer, ‘Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levee en Masse
in 1918’,Journal of Modern History, 73 (2001), 459–528.
- Hans von Seeckt,Thoughts of a Soldier, trans. G. Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn,
1930), 55.
- Robert Citino,The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army,
1920–1939(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
- Michael Geyer,Aufru ̈stung oder Sicherheit? Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik,
1924–1926(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980).
- See H. J. Mauch,Nationalistische Wehrorganisationen in der Weimarer Republik. Zur
Entwicklung und Ideologie des ‘Paramilitarismus’(Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 1982).
- Cf. Robert Citino,Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe,
1899–1940(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 202; and James Corum,
The Roots of Blitzkrieg(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 193ff.
- Corum,The Roots of Blitzkrieg; Citino,Path to Blitzkrieg; and specifically Robert M.
Citino, ‘The Weimar Roots of German Military Planning in the 1930s’, inMilitary
Planning and the Origins of the Second World War, eds. B. J. C. McKercher and
R. Legault (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001), 59–87.
- Ernst Volckheim,Der Kampfwagen in der heutigen Kriegfu ̈hrung(Berlin: Mittler, 1924).
- The memo is analyzed and contextualized in Mary R. Habeck,Storm of Steel: The
Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939(Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 72ff.
- This development is contextualized in Azar Gat,British Armour Theory and the Rise of
the Panzer Arm: Revising the Revisionists(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
Prussian–German Operational Art, 1740–1943 61
