- Karl-Volker Neugebauer, ‘Operatives Denken zwischen dem Ersten und Zweiten
Weltkrieg’, inOperatives Denken und Handeln, 97–122. - Citino, ‘Military Planning’, 77ff.
- Thomas L. Jentz,Panzer-Truppen, vol. I (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 1996), 11ff. The best
general analysis is R. L. DiNardo,Germany’s Panzer Arm(Westport, CT: Praeger,
1997). - See generally Wilhelm Deist,The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament(London:
Macmillan, 1981); and Michael Geyer, ‘Ru ̈stungsbeschleunigung und Inflation. Zur
Inflationsdenkschrift des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht von November 1938’,
Milita ̈rgeschichtliche Mitteilungen,30 (1981), 121–86. Beck’s position is presented in
detail in Klaus-Ju ̈rgen Mu ̈ller,General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur
politisch-milita ̈risch Vorstellungswelt und Ta ̈tigkeit des Generalstabchefs des deutschen
Heeres(Boppard: Boldt, 1980). - Citino,German Way of War, xiii–xiv.
- Klaus-Ju ̈rgen Mu ̈ller,Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime
1933–1940(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969). - George Raudzens, ‘Blitzkrieg Ambiguities: Doubtful Usage of a Famous Word’,War
and Society, 7 (1988), 77–94. - Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood,Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in
the West(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005). - The German mobile forces included six panzer, four motorized, and four light divi-
sions, the last of which resembling in structure and intended mission a US Cold War
armoured cavalry regiment. Recent operationally focused accounts include Steven J.
Zaloga’s volume in the Osprey Campaign series,Poland 1919: The Birth of Blitzkrieg
(Oxford: Osprey, 2002); and Reginald Hargreaves,Blitzkrieg Unleashed: The German
Invasion of Poland, 1939(Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2008). - Still the best for detail is Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb: Der Kampf um den Deutschen
Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1957). - Heinz Guderian,Panzer Leader, trans. C. Fitzgibbon (New York: Dutton, 1952), 90–1.
Cf. the notes in C. Burdick and H.-A. Jacobsen (eds.),The Halder War Diary,
1939–1942(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 92ff., 98ff. - Cf. Bruno Chaix,En Mai 1940, fallait-il entrer en Belgique? De ́cisions strate ́giques et
plans ope ́rationnels de la campagne de France,2nd edn. (Paris: Economica, 2005); and
D. W. Alexander, ‘Repercussions of the Breda Variant’,French Historical Studies,
8 (1974), 459–88. - The contingent nature of the German success in the crucial initial stages is demon-
strated by Robert Doughty,The Breaking Wave: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
(Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1990). Cf. Eric Denis, ‘1940, La Bataille de Stonne. La
Resistance heroique de l’armee francaise’,L’Historie Militaire de France,Thematique,
no. 2 (2008). - Frieser,Blitzkrieg Legend, 291ff., is solid and scathing of the event and its conse-
quences. - Dennis E. Showalter,Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Berkeley Caliber, 2006), 262 passim. - Geoffrey P. Megargee,War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), is the best brief overview in English.
David Stahel,Operation Barbarossa and German Military Defeat in the East(New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), emphasizes the internal shortcomings of the
mobile forces and their consequences for operational art. D. Glantz (ed.),The Initial
62 The Evolution of Operational Art