envelopment of Stalingrad using the forces of the three fronts, augmented by new
forces from the Stavka reserve. The South-Western Front would jump off from
the bridgeheads it already held on the south side of the Don River. These forces
would strike the flanking Romanian armies, break through, and complete the
encirclement of 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army. While mobile forces advanced to
the west and south-west on the external front of the envelopment, other troops
comprising the inner envelopment would isolate the Stalingrad force and destroy the
pocket. At first, Stalin expressed fears that the plan was too ambitious and proposed
to move the flank attacks closer to Stalingrad. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky stated their
opposition and stressed the vulnerability of the Romanian armies. Finally, Stalin
agreed. Both men then went to Stalingrad to begin preparations.
The most difficult role in the period of preparations fell to Vasilii Chuikov who
assumed command of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad that September. When asked
by his front commander, Colonel-General Andrei Eremenko, and Nikita Khrush-
chev, senior party representative to the front, if he understood his mission, he
replied: ‘We will defend the city or die in the attempt.’ 41 The men of the 62nd
Army did both over the next two months, albeit at the cost of monumental losses.
The deeper the German forces were drawn into the urban fighting, the more likely
the success of the flank offensives by the South-Western and Don Fronts.
The Stavka spent two months preparing for Uranus. Fresh forces were de-
ployed and concealed from German observation. Generals Vatutin and Rokos-
sovsky were appointed commanders of the South-Western and Don Fronts on
Zhukov’s recommendation. Soviet rear services expedited rail movement of
Stavka reserves to the attacking fronts’ assembly areas. As he had done at
KhalKhin-Gol in 1939, Zhukov ordered the troops to build defensive positions
to make the enemy believe that the Red Army was going over to the defence in
preparation for winter. Meanwhile, Soviet intelligence started delivering more
information on the status of the Romanian units targeted for attack. 42
On 19 November, the Soviet forces struck the Romanian lines, achieving
complete surprise. Massed artillery fire announced the beginning of the offensive.
Advancing infantry, supported by tanks, penetrated the Romanian forward
defences and created openings for the commitment of tank and cavalry forma-
tions to mount the deep attack with the objective of the South-Western and
Stalingrad Fronts meeting to encircle the 6th Army and elements of the 4th
Panzer Army. The link-up at Kalach took place on 21 November. Inside the
pocket, 290,000 German and Allied troops were trapped.
Hitler refused to abandon Stalingrad, and Goering pledged that the Luftwaffe
would supply the besieged army by air. In December, Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein’s attempt to break the encirclement failed. Soviet forces followed
Uranus with Operation Little Saturn to expand the external front, striking
towards Rostov on the Don to cut off Army Group A in the Caucasus and to
clear the lower Don region. While failing to reach Rostov, the attack did push
back the German forces and captured a number of airfields used by the Luftwaffe
in its attempt to resupply Stalingrad.
The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991 77