War or Peace? 119
suggested to its commanders in the field that Yverdon and Romont should be
pawned to the two cities if six rich Savoyards could not be found to stand surety
in any peace negotiations; at all events, they should occupy castle Rolle as a
precautionary measure.431 Meanwhile, Avenches, a town in the bishop of Lausanne’s
territory, appealed to Bern for protection since it was leaning towards the new
doctrines. Bern’s first inclination was to refuse432—it had quite enough on its
plate. More astonishingly, Helena von Diesbach, a scion of the Bernese dynasty
who was married to Michel Mangerod, baron of La Sarraz, one of the leaders of the
League of the Spoon, offered to place her husband’s lordship under Bernese
control. It is hard to believe that she acted with her husband’s knowledge or
consent! In the event, Bern was only prepared to consider the offer if both Fribourg
and Solothurn agreed.433
Peace negotiations began days later in the field at Geneva. They turned essentially
on four points: whether the Burgrecht with Geneva should be cancelled (or put on
hold); whether the duke’s rights in and over the city (above all the office of justi-
ciar) should be recognized; what compensation Bern, Fribourg, and Solothurn
should receive;434 and what should happen to the ‘bandits’ (the Mammelu exiles).
If the draft treaty were breached by Savoy, Bern and Fribourg were to occupy the
Vaud.435 These were matters which had exercised the combatants for months, for
years even, and were unlikely to be resolved in a hurry.436 The peace treaty signed
at St-Julien on 19 October was clearly intended as an interim, pending further
arbitration which was pencilled in for Payerne a month later.437
St-Julien’s significance lay not in the detail but the context. It was brokered by
all the cantons (except Glarus) and two of the Confederation’s associated members,
St Gallen and the Valais: that in itself testifies to the importance attached to healing
what had become a running sore. Apart from lifting the blockade of Geneva,
providing for the punishment of transgressors, and ordering the withdrawal of all
troops St-Julien contained little that was new:438 the threat of losing the Vaud to
431 EA IV, 1b, 798–9 (no. 402: 1, 3) (Oct. 1530). On 1 Aug. in a letter to Fribourg Bern had
warned the bailiffs of the common lordships of Grandson and Échallens to strengthen their defences
and to send out spies to reconnoitre. SABE, Teutsche Missiven-Buch 21 S, fo. 359v.
432 EA IV, 1b, 799 (no. 402: 2) (Oct. 1530).
433 EA IV, 1b, 800 (no. 402: 7) (Oct. 1530). Michel Mangerod, lord de la Bruyères, was a bastard
of the barons de Gingins-Chatelard, the ancient family of La Sarraz, who had been installed as heir by
his mother. Helena was the daughter of Christoph von Diesbach (1483–1522), a Bernese councillor
who also acquired citizenship in Fribourg.
434 The three cities estimated their war expenditure at 40,000 écus, and that figure included com-
pensation from Geneva. The city offered an initial payment of 2000 écus. EA IV, 1b, 821 (no. 417: I).
435 EA IV, 1b, 806–9 (no. 407: 1, 3; 1, 4; 1, 6; 1, 10; 1, 11; 1, 12; 1, 14; 1, 17) (Oct. 1530). There
is an obscure reference at 1, 3 that Bern and Fribourg should occupy the Vaud and Gex anyway as a
means strengthening their defences (‘fürslag’)—against whom, one wonders. I cannot agree with
Paquier, Pays de Vaud, 2, 243 that the mortgaging of the Vaud was an ominous portent of the future:
it had been mooted from 1527 onwards, if not earlier.
436 Not least since the Bernese council had to upbraid its troops for having set fire to castle Gaillard,
which belonged to Savoy and was sheltering Mammelu refugees, in defiance of the agreed truce. EA
IV, 1b, 808 (no. 407: 4).
437 EA IV, 1b, 810–11 (no. 409) and 1501–6: Appendix 14.
438 There was one curious clause which stipulated that Bern and Fribourg should not be punished
for their attack on Payerne and Gruyère. In fact, the negotiations in the field had previously explicitly