Religion or Politics? 127
For a time, these religious tensions ran alongside the issue of Savoy reparations.
In April Duke Charles signalled that he would now pay the 21,000 écus he
owed in full if Bern and Fribourg would abandon their reversionary right to the
Vaud and help restore his authority in Geneva.501 This insidious inversion of
the treaty terms cut no ice. Fribourg was only too happy to receive payment but
had no intention of sacrificing the Vaud, in which case the offer would lapse.
Moreover, Fribourg reminded Savoy that the pledge of the Vaud was intended
not simply as a surety for payment but also as a deterrent against any attack on
Geneva.502 It was Bern, once again the restraining hand, which advised Fribourg
to accept the deal, but the latter insisted on seeing cash down in the presence of
Genevan witnesses.503
In May Bern and Fribourg’s envoys thought they had reached a compromise
whereby the vidomnat would be restored to Savoy, though not at the expense of the
bishop’s or the city’s rights. But in a quite remarkable change of tack any failure to
comply on the duke’s part, specifically observation of the treaties of St-Julien and
Payerne, would no longer entail forfeiture of the Vaud but merely the pledge of the
four—admittedly strategically situated and well-fortified—communes of Romont,
Yverdon, Cudrefin, and Estavayer, which Duke Charles was allowed to redeem
within a month for 20,000 écus; on full payment the communes were to revert to
Savoy after three years.504
Although the declaration was issued in the name of both cities, this substantial
concession may have been driven by Bern, given Fribourg’s reaction in the coming
months, driven by confessional considerations.505 What had brought it about?
Although no direct link can be demonstrated, the outbreak of rioting in Geneva—
with unpredictable consequences for the stability of the Romandie as a whole—may
have encouraged the Bernese council to forestall an impetuous response from Savoy:
it is certainly worth noting that Bern and Fribourg simultaneously recognized the
duke’s rights over Lausanne, having previously contested them.506
On closer inspection it emerges that Fribourg was pursuing a policy which
directly reflected its confessional loyalty. While not yielding an inch in its financial
demands on Savoy,507 a pension of 3600 fl in July was sufficient to persuade
Fribourg to renew its Burgrecht with Savoy.508 By contrast, the support which
Fribourg had energetically given to Lausanne against Savoy in 1525 now came
501 EA IV, 1c, 59 (no. 37: I) (April 1533).
502 EA IV, 1c, 59–60 (no. 37: II; to II) (April 1533).
503 EA IV, 1c, 67–8 (no. 43: I, 1; II; III) (April–May 1533).
504 EA IV, 1c, 72 (no. 49: a) (May 1533); SABE, Unnütze Papiere, Freiburg 391, no. 96 (5 May 1533).
505 EA IV, 1c, 75–6 (no. 52: II) (May 1533); Gaston Castella, ‘L’intervention de Fribourg lors de la
conquête du Pays de Vaud (janvier 1536-février 1536)’, Annales Fribourgeoises, 7 (1919), 89–105, here at 91.
506 EA IV, 1c, 73 (no. 49: b) (May 1533).
507 EA IV, 1c, 76 (no. 52: II) (May 1533); 91–2 (no. 57) (June 1533). If full payment were not
forthcoming by August Fribourg would claim the plate previously offered by René de Challant and
seize Cudrefin and Estavayer in mortgage.
508 EA IV, 1c, 126 (no. 76) (July 1533); BA, Abschriftensammlung XIX Torino, Archivio di
Stato: Negoziazioni con Svizzera, 57, 1 bis (13/6); Documenti di Storia Sabauda, 89. Castella,
‘Intervention’, 91 believes this was done for explicitly confessional reasons, against the background
of Peter Werli’s murder.