The Spoils of War 149
with Bern, eagerly agreed, but demurred at sending troops to Yverdon. It hoped to
achieve the handover of Romont and Rue peacefully, but was prepared to have
recourse to arms if necessary. At the same time it made clear that it harboured
further territorial ambitions, above all towards Vevey.678 In this it appears to have
had the clandestine backing of the Valais communes, who hoped that its success
would provide flanking cover for the latter’s invasion of the eastern Chablais and
so draw the sting of the Catholic cantons’ hostility.679 Indeed, at the next diet at
Luzern, the Catholic cantons expressed their regret but conceded that it may
have sprung from the best intentions.680 In fact, the list of places to which Fribourg
laid claim was quite substantial. Apart from Romont and Rue, it comprised
Vevey, Montreux, Châtel-St-Denis, Vaulruz, St-Aubin en Vully (with all of which
Fribourg had Burgrechte); Estavayer (where it held one-third of the lordship); and
Romainmôtier. It then added Surpierre, where many Fribourg citizens held estates,
just as with Vevey.681
Bern was willing to cede all these places barring Vevey, Montreux, Romainmôtier,
and by default Surpierre. But Fribourg did not stand upon ceremony. Within days
it had taken both Vevey and Surpierre. At first the Bernese council was prepared to
accept matters as they stood, except for Montreux, whose inhabitants had already
sworn allegiance to Bern.682 But then it learnt that Vevey had already submitted to
Bernese forces. This created great embarrassment and confusion, not only between
Bern and Fribourg,683 but above all between the council and the army command.
So bitter were the exchanges that the Small Council deemed it prudent to convoke
the Great Council; as a result of its deliberations the former agreed to back down
and rescind its decision to hand over Vevey and Surpierre.684
Fribourg’s territorial ambitions were concentrated on two areas: first, the northern
shore of Lake Geneva stretching inland from Vevey and Montreux, which bordered
the lands of the counts of Gruyère (these also became an object of desire); and the
communes in the Broye valley between Moudon and Payerne (which were confirmed
as Fribourg territory by the Treaty of Turin in 1578, and remain Fribourg exclaves
678 SABE, Teutsche Missiven-Buch 24 W, pp. 180–3, 185a–6 (Feb. 1536); AEF, Diplomatische
Korrespondenz a) Bern: 72 (17 Feb. 1536); Instruktionsbuch 2, fo. 158v–159r (3 March 1536).
Should Fribourg refuse, Bern would willingly subjugate them.
679 Jeanne Niquille, ‘Quand Fribourg voulait un port sur le Léman (1536)’, in Mélanges d’histoire
et de littérature offerts à Monsieur Charles Gilliard à l’occasion de son soixante cinquième anniversaire
(Lausanne, 1944), 331–43, here at 333.
680 EA IV, 1c, 638 (no. 388: to a 3) (Feb. 1536). To the Catholic cantons Fribourg argued that its
intention was to save Vevey and elsewhere for the faith. In the case of Romont, Solothurn informed
Luzern that Fribourg was acting for the same reason, which was certainly a generous interpretation of
the facts. SASO, Missiven 16, pp. 41–2 (17 Feb. 1536). By contrast, both Fribourg and the Valais
communes faced taunts that they were secretly promoting the new faith! AEF, Missivale 12, fo. 29v–30r
(n.d.: late Jan.–early Feb. 1536).
681 EA IV, 1c, 639–40 (no. 389: 1; 2; 3; 4) (Feb. 1536); Gilliard, Eroberung, 103–4 [169–71].
682 EA IV, 1c, 648–9 (no. 396) (Feb. 1536).
683 EA IV, 1c, 651–2 (no. 399) (March 1536). Bern blamed Fribourg for failing to send envoys to
Vevey to ascertain the situation.
684 Vasella, ‘Krieg Berns’, B 19 n 1; Jean Niquille, ‘Le comte Jean de Gruyère et les conquêtes
bernoises de 1536’, in Festschrift Oskar Vasella zum 60. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 1964 (Fribourg, 1964),
235–46, here at 239–41; Gilliard, Eroberung, 108 [178].