The Romandie: A Commercial Crossroads 69
For eastern Switzerland salt-provisioning was hardly a problem. Salt could be
shipped conveniently across Lake Konstanz from the salt mines of Tirol or Bavaria
(though the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs could block deliveries as a political lever
against the Swiss if they so chose), or from the salt pans of Schwäbisch Hall.
Schaffhausen became the principal entrepôt for its distribution.44 But western
Switzerland relied almost entirely on supplies from the brine pits of the Franche-
Comté, though on occasion Genevan merchants offered to supply sea salt.45 Even
so, it seems that output was insufficient to cover the needs of Geneva, the Vaud, the
Valais, or the germanophone west (see Map 4).46 Latterly some salt was hauled up
the Rhône from the salt pans of Aigues-Mortes,47 but not until 1680 were the salt
pans of Bex in Bern’s lordship of Aigle brought into commercial production.48
Given that control of the Franche-Comté shuttled between rival sovereigns, the
Swiss in the Romandie were always on the alert for any interruption to supplies.
In our period there were threats to the brine pits at Salins, by destruction or blockade,
from France in 1477,49 1503,50 and 1523.51 Salins was not, however, the only
source. Further brine pits were worked at Lons-le-Saunier,52 while there was pro-
tracted wrangling over the opening of new salt pans at St-Hippolyte in 1504–5
under Württemberg control53 (which in the end led to the venture being
abandoned),54 and a proposal to exploit a new source at Poligny in 1509.55 But it
was not simply the authorities who might cause trouble. From time to time the salt-
masters themselves might block deliveries in order to raise prices or press for higher
wages.56 No wonder, then, that the constant uncertainty gave Bern and its allies
every reason to take possession of the Franche-Comté if the opportunity arose.57
Apart from its lack of mineral resources, the Romandie, except in the raw valleys
of the Jura, was a fertile and prosperous landscape. In the rolling uplands of the
44 Markus Furrer, ‘Schaffhausen—Salzhafen der Eidgenossen. Salz und Salzhandel im spätmitte-
lalterlichen Schaffhausen: Eine Quantifizierung’, Schaffhauser Beiträge zur Geschichte, 85 (2011),
67–101.
45 Denis Tappy, Les États de Vaud (Bibliothèque Historique Vaudoise, 91) (Lausanne, 1988), 421, 424.
46 Babel, Histoire économique, 2, 300.
47 Ammann, ‘Geschichte der Westschweiz’, 44; Babel, Histoire économique, 2, 315.
48 HLS, s.v. Bex. 49 EA II, 697–8 (no. 914: to e).
50 SASO, Denkwürdige Sachen 8, p. 120: Bern to Solothurn, 28 Jan. 1503.
51 Archduchess Margaret of Austria had already warned the Swiss of French invasion plans which
would threaten to cut off salt deliveries: AEF, Diplomatische Korrespondenz a) Bern: 44 (3 Jan. 1523).
52 Tappy, États, 420.
53 SASO, Denkwürdige Sachen 18, p. 104: Fribourg to Bern, 19 July 1504; Denkwürdige Sachen
19, pp. 24–24a: Hans von Wingarten at St-Hippolyte to Bern, 13 March 1505, reporting technical
deficiencies in the mines. EA III, 2, 265 (no. 160); 270 (no. 165); 276–7 (no. 174: a); 283–4
(no. 178); 289 (no. 184); 292 (no. 189). The problem was also that overlordship was disputed between
Württemberg and Austria, with the lords of Valangin also staking claims. Bern, Basel, Fribourg, and
Solothurn sought to buy out Württemberg’s rights.
54 EA III, 2, 316 (no. 214); 318 (no. 218); 324 (no. 227: a); 342 (no. 244) (final settling of
accounts, April 1506).
55 AEF, Ratsmanuale 27, fo. 21v.
56 As the Estates of the Vaud complained in 1516 or Fribourg in 1538. Tallone, Parlamento
Sabaudo, XIII, 2, 270 (no. 7627); AEF, Missivale 11, fo. 49r: Fribourg to the parlement at Dole,
21 June 1538.
57 During the Swiss War of 1499, however, Salins and the administration of the Franche-Comté
sought to reach agreement with the Swiss over salt deliveries, but only on condition that the Franche-
Comté was not attacked! EA III, 1, 602–3 (no. 643: i); 603–4 (no. 644: d).