74 The Swiss and Their Neighbours, 1460–1560
foundered not only on Emperor Frederick III’s half-hearted commitment70—no
additional troops were forthcoming—but also on a secret truce between Burgundy
and France which gave Charles the Bold a free hand to retake Alsace if he so
chose.71 Nevertheless, the underlying strategic aim remained unaltered, for in 1475
fresh campaigns were launched into the Franche-Comté against Pontarlier and
Blamont. As a result of this initial débâcle the way was left open, according to
Bernhard Stettler, for Bern and Fribourg to mount an attack on their own initiative
on the Vaud, where many towns and lordships were held by Burgundian vassals.
Here Stettler is content to follow Bittmann, who cited entries in the Bernese council
minute-books from late December 1474 which in his view implied a predetermined
plan. In fact, as Bittmann himself stated, Bern insisted on acting only with Fribourg’s
approval, with the joint aim of occupying Grandson, Yverdon, and other fortresses
in the west—in short, what Yolande had refused to do and to which the guardian-
ship of the Vaud might seem to entitle them—namely, to forestall the other cantons
from an incursion which might lay the Vaud to waste.72 The minute-book goes on
to identify the communes (Zenden) of the Valais, an associated member of the
Confederation since the early fifteenth century, as further potential invaders,73 a
highly telling remark, since it was the Zenden who indeed cherished hopes of annex-
ing the Lower Valais at Savoy’s expense, and who emerged from the Burgundian
Wars as the main territorial beneficiaries (with substantial further gains in 1536).
A sober reading of Bern’s motives then and thereafter indicates the primacy of
strategic-defensive considerations over aggressive-expansionist designs.
The one exception was Niklaus von Diesbach, the Bernese councillor and com-
mander of the city’s forces until his death in August 1475. An older historiography,
exemplified by Richard Feller, believed that the Bernese council was torn between
a war party under von Diesbach and a peace party under his great rival Adrian von
Bubenberg—whose opposition to precipitate hostilities was to lead to his exclu-
sion from the Small Council.74 Recent historians have been less keen to see the
Bernese elite as split over policy than divided by familial and kin loyalties.75 What
is true is that von Diesbach as a bilingual career diplomat developed a foreign
policy very much of his own devising, shaped by his contacts with the French
70 Stettler, Eidgenossenschaft, 247. 71 Bittmann, Memoiren, 656–7.
72 SABE, Ratsmanuale 9, p. 27: Item von Safföy wegen ist berett vnd gerattslaget worden, das man
die selben ding furderlich an die von Friburg durch ein treffenlich bottschafft bringen und die suchen,
mitt irem ratt vnd willen vnderstan sol, damit man si darbi ouch behobe, vnd wann dann das mit irem
rätt beslossen wirt, dan sol man zů Granson, Ifferden vnd ouch den selben slossen trů vn darzů
gedencken, wie man sich an den von Jenff ouch vechen well. Vnd dz alles sol man mit fugen furnemen,
damit annder eidn̄ōn̄ still sitzen vnd das land von Safföy nit verwůsten. Bittmann, Memoiren, 769.
Bittmann’s interpretation is all the more singular since it was he who demonstrated beyond peradven-
ture that Bern and its Swiss allies, and the Lower Union had their eyes firmly fixed on the
Franche-Comté.
73 SABE, Ratsmanuale 9, p. 27: Item von der eidgn̄ōn̄ vnd valliser wegen, wie man die stillen well,
das si in das land von Safföy nit ziechent sunder min herren am ersten des innemend....
74 Richard Feller, Geschichte Berns, 1: Von den Anfängen bis 1516, 4th edn (Bern/Frankfurt am Main,
1974), 379–87. For a critique see Adolf Gasser, ‘Ewige Richtung und Burgunderkriege. Zur Klärung
einer alten Streitfrage’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, 23 (1973), 697–749, here at 702 ff.
75 Walter, Informationen, 55, 68–70.