[B]y mutual consent it has become possible that certain laws
should originate as between all states, or a great many states;
and it is apparent that the laws thus originating had in view the
advantage, not of par tic u lar states, but of the great society of
states. And this is what is called the law of nations, whenever we
distinguish that term from the law of nature.
—Hugo Grotius Th e peace negotiations for the Th irty Years War, which took place in
two towns in Westphalia (Osnabrück and Münster), were a major po liti cal
showcase. Th ey were not a rushed aff air. Talks were originally to have begun
in 1642, but haggling over matters of etiquette and pre ce dence of the dele-
gates kept things from getting under way for some two years. What the
proceedings lacked in urgency, however, they made up for (at least partly) in
style. One ambassador’s train of attendants was so extensive that it is said to
have taken a full hour to pass by any given spot.
Th e talks were comparably slow- moving. Only aft er four years of negotia-
tions, in 1648, were two treaties concluded that comprised the Peace of West-
phalia: the Treaty of Osnabrück, between Sweden on the one side, and the
Holy Roman Empire and German princes on the other; and the Treaty of
Münster, between France and the empire and princes. Among the achieve-
ments of the peace was the creation of a new constitutional order within the
Holy Roman Empire. Th is confi rmed the powers of the individual German
states— which they had already been exercising in practice— to act in de pen-
dently in international aff airs by such means as concluding treaties of alli-
ance and peace. Crucially, however, at least in theory, these powers were not
to be exercised to the prejudice of the Holy Roman emperor himself.
Although the papacy had played an intermediary role in the negotiations,
Pope Innocent X made it clear that he was strongly opposed to the conces-
sion of religious freedom to the Protestant rulers within the empire. He sourly
issued a formal denunciation of the settlement, condemning the peace as
“null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of
meaning and eff ect for all time.” Th e message was clear enough, even if the
practical impact was nil.
With the passage of time, the Peace of Westphalia came to assume a sort
of triple identity— fi rst, as a settlement of immediate issues at stake in the