140 Reason and Its Rivals (ca. 1550–1815)
Th irty Years War; second, and more broadly, as a basis for a longer- term Eu-
ro pe an balance of power; and fi nally, and most expansively of all, as a model
or meta phor for modern international aff airs in general. It is the third of
these that has played the greatest role in the collective mentality of interna-
tional lawyers. In this connection, the Peace of Westphalia has sometimes
been hailed as the beginning of the modern state system or as the founda-
tion event of modern international law. Such claims are largely hollow. In-
ternational law, in the sense of a consciousness of rules that place binding
obligations on states, had existed for many centuries before 1648. Nor did
the peace of that year mark any kind of “constitutional” event in the history
of Eu rope at large. At most, it was an attempt to bring a mea sure of long-
term po liti cal stability to the Eu ro pe an po liti cal scene, by way of a kind of
long- term balance of power between the major states.
Over the course of time, the meta phorical aspect of the peace became
more prominent than the true historical one, as “Westphalian” came to be
employed largely as a term of abuse. It has come to be a derogatory short-
hand expression for a picture of world aff airs that is fundamentally
anarchical— that is, characterized by jealously in de pen dent states perpetu-
ally competing with one another for territorial or other advantages, and ac-
knowledging no superior authority. Th is bleak ste reo type may have only the
most tenuous connection (if even that) to the terms and context of the ac-
tual Westphalian settlement. But, for better or worse, the legend has proved
more potent than the facts.
It should be appreciated, though, that the freedom of states in the anar-
chic “Westphalian” world has never been altogether untrammeled. Admit-
tedly, it is true that, since at least the Reformation, the idea of papal or impe-
rial institutions exercising a permanent oversight or restraint on governments
no longer held sway. But one important component of the universalist vision
of the Middle Ages still remained. Th is was natural law. It continued to hover
above the various in de pen dent states— rather like the emperor over his some-
times overmighty princely subjects— and, at least in principle, to place legal
restraints on their actions.
Th e comparison extends somewhat further. Just as the Holy Roman em-
peror, though much reduced in power from his medieval days of glory, was
more than a mere cipher, so natural law was more than the whimsical spec-
ulations of bookmen. In fact, its hold over the Eu ro pe an mind— if not quite