Putting Nature and Nations Asunder 171element of free will. Th e law of nations, in contrast, was a man- made arti-
fi ce, a product of human initiative and free will, with its contents deter-
mined by circumstances and context as perceived by the humans who
craft ed it. Th e law of nature was binding on all states in the world, without
exception. Th e law of nations bound only those who had participated in its
creation or who had consented to observe it.
An early fi gure in the dualist or Grotian tradition was the En glish judge
and legal scholar Richard Zouche (or Zachaeus, to Latin devotees), who
was a younger contemporary of Grotius. Zouche became the holder of
Gentili’s old professorship of civil law at Oxford in 1620, and also a mem-
ber of the British Parliament, as well as an admiralty judge. His major work
was entitled An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law between
Nations, and Questions Concerning the Same, published in 1650. (By “fecial
law” was meant the fetial law of ancient Rome dealing with declarations of
war.) He also wrote on diplomatic immunity and on admiralty and eccle-
siastical law.
One of Zouche’s contributions to international law was the invention of
an early version of what became the modern name for the subject (albeit in
the Latin tongue). In place of the received expression “ius gentium,” he sug-
gested substituting “ius inter gentes.” Th at is, he favored speaking of a “law
between nations” instead of a “law of nations.” Th e reason behind this pro-
posed change was to make it clear that the law governing relations between
states was importantly diff erent from the original Roman-law ius gentium,
which Zouche correctly explained to be merely “the common element in the
law” in transactions between individuals. Th is newly minted expression
marks the arrival— if only in Latin— of the term “international law.” It
would be rendered into En glish in the late eigh teenth century.
In his treatment of this ius inter gentes, Zouche followed Grotius’s dualis-
tic lead. Part of the law between nations comprises natural law, which con-
sists of conclusions “proceeding from the fi rst principles of nature.” Th e law
of nations, in contrast, is a human construction, arising out of agreement. It
is of two kinds. One is a body of law of universal application, arising out of
“general agreement” between states. Th e other comprises par tic u lar agree-
ments between specifi c states (most obviously in the form of treaties).
Th e impact of Grotius was similarly evident in the writing of the German
scholar Samuel Rachel. Th e son of a Lutheran minister, Rachel served as a