212 Reason and Its Rivals (ca. 1550– 1815)seizing foodstuff s as contraband of war. Th e issue was decided in the Ameri-
cans’ favor, meaning that such seizures were not lawful. Th e tribunal sat
until 1804, making awards of damage of some £1.3 million to American
claimants, and some $110,000 to British ones.
One other noteworthy legal advance in the English- speaking world oc-
curred in the period of the French Revolutionary wars. Th is was the evolu-
tion of a substantial body of important case law on various aspects of mari-
time war— most of all on issues of neutrality— from the British admiralty
courts. Th e most outstanding fi gure was William Scott (who, much later,
became Lord Stowell). Originally from Newcastle, Scott was a highly capa-
ble lawyer and a general bon vivant (being a member of Samuel Johnson’s
literary and artistic circle). In his court judgments, he revealed himself as a
stylist to rival even Vattel. He may also be thought of as perhaps the supreme
fi gure in the pragmatic tradition, along with Martens. His judgments showed
a close familiarity with the actual practices of maritime aff airs, in both peace
and war (including a keen nose for fraud and skulduggery). He relied on this
knowledge as the best evidence of the state of international law in the cases
that came before him.
In Scott’s opinion, international law was founded on “the usages and prac-
tices of nations” rather than on “mere speculative general principles.” It
would therefore be wrong, he maintained, to give eff ect to “general theory...
in de pen dent of all practice.” Scott conceded that the law of nations was “in-
troduced” by general principles, but then immediately cautioned that “it
travels with these principles only to a certain extent: and, if it stops there, [a
judge is] not at liberty to go farther, and to say, that mere general specula-
tions would bear you out in a further progress.” He announced his deter-
mination to “take my stand on the ancient and universal practice of man-
kind; and say that as far as that practice has gone, I am willing to go; and
where it has thought proper to stop, there I must stop likewise.”
Scott nonetheless made invaluable contributions to international law, by
clarifying and fl eshing out the details of existing practices. He was a con-
summate fi ller of gaps, if not a maker of daring leaps. His most important
judgments were in the area of maritime neutrality, and most outstandingly
to the detailed elaboration of the law relating to blockade. He also laid the
foundation for what later became known as the law of unneutral ser vice,
which was the law dealing with actions by supposedly neutral states that as-