268 A Positive Century (1815–1914)system of international law.” Natural law, on the other hand, is rooted in
“the permanent laws of human nature.” Far from being ashamed of specu-
lation as a method of legal science, he lamented that lawyers did too little
speculating rather than too much. He candidly revealed his allegiance to the
rationalist tradition of natural law by holding the creation of a systematic
body of law to be “a labour of the closet.”
In distancing himself so pointedly from positivism, Lorimer stressed two
important tenets of his own thought: fi rst, an “ethical element” in interna-
tional law and second, the importance of the interdependence of the states of
the world with one another, instead of their in de pen dence. Regarding the
ethical element, his perspective was, to put it mildly, a broad one. In a spirit
distinctly reminiscent of the ancient stoics, he voiced the belief “that the
universe, as a whole, is an ethical as well as a physical cosmos.”
It was on the question of interdependence that Lorimer’s distinctiveness
was most in evidence. He identifi ed two extreme schools of thought on this
subject. One of them was labeled the “national” school, also termed the “nega-
tive” or “patriotic.” It stressed the in de pen dence and isolation of states— the
vision held by mainstream state positivists. Lorimer bluntly condemned this
as a “lawless doctrine.” At the opposite extreme was the position that he
termed “cosmopolitan,” or alternatively “philanthropic.” Th is extreme cosmo-
politan viewpoint regarded states as altogether absent from the picture, with
the whole of humanity functioning as a single society. Lorimer announced
his task to be the steering of a middle way between these two. He would ac-
cept the existence and autonomy of states— but, crucially, “not apart from,
but in and through the recognition of international dependence.” Lorimer’s
middle way was clearly more compatible with the cosmopolitan position
than with its opposite.
Lorimer was overtly critical of voluntarism for attempting to build interna-
tional law on the excessively unstable foundation of the concordant wills of
states. He had a low opinion of treaty law generally, regarding it as “a mere
makeshift .” Treaty- based systems— and voluntarist systems in general—
have the fatal weakness of requiring unanimity among the parties. “Th e mo-
ment that one of the parties changes its mind,” he objected, “the unanimity
ceases, and the basis on which the treaty rested is cut away.” He had a much
higher opinion of customary law— which he regarded, like the historical
school, as being essentially legislative rather than contractual in character. He