In Full Flower 327was Renault. In the admiring words of James Brown Scott, he came to be
“looked on as one set apart,” acting as “a trusted adviser, counselor and guide
of the entire Conference.” Scott hailed him as “the incarnation of the spirit and
purpose of the Conference.” As such, he transcended the parochial interests of
his country. “He came to the Conference a Frenchman,” averred Scott; “he left
it as a citizen of the world.” His stature received due recognition in the im-
mediate aft ermath of the gathering, in the form of the Nobel Peace Prize.
Given the much larger and more varied attendance at this second confer-
ence, the principle of unanimity became strained to the breaking point. As in
the previous gathering, there was no formal rule on the point. But it was gener-
ally accepted that a requirement of unanimity fl owed automatically from the
principle of the legal equality of states. In practice, though, the conference op-
erated on a basis described as “quasi unanimity.” Th is was never very precisely
defi ned. But the essence of it was that a substantial majority of states in favor of
something would be (somehow) deemed to constitute or signify unanimity.
One observer characterized this practice, with approval, as “a slightly veiled
transition to the principle of majority rule” in multilateral treaty draft ing.
Th e bulk of the work of the second conference dealt with further elabora-
tion of the laws of armed confl ict. In fact, so dominant were questions of the
conduct of war that some observers sourly commented that the gathering
ought accurately to have been labeled as the “Hague War Conference.” Some
slight alterations were made in the Hague Rules. Th e declaration barring the
launching of projectiles from balloons, which had expired in 1904, was rein-
stated, this time until the gathering of an envisaged Th ird Hague Peace Con-
ference. In addition, a dozen other conventions were draft ed on various
aspects of armed confl ict. One concerned the issuing of declarations of war
at the onset of hostilities. Two of the Hague Conventions dealt with the
rights and duties of neutral powers— one in land war and the other in mari-
time war. Th e convention on maritime neutrality was a disappointment, in
that it failed to resolve a number of issues relating to contraband, blockades,
destruction of neutral ships at sea by belligerents, and unneutral ser vice.
Other conventions dealt with more specifi c aspects of maritime warfare.
One covered naval bombardment in war time, requiring the giving of prior
notice. Another contained several specifi c restrictions on capture at sea—
such as the exemption from capture of mailships and of fi shermen. Con-
spicuously, however, the convention did not contain a complete prohibition