350 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )was planned, since the Allied governments accepted the conclusion that the
planning of aggressive war was not a criminal off ense in international law. It
was decided, though, that a “special tribunal” should be convened to try ex-
Kaiser (as he now was) William II for what was described as “a supreme of-
fence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” (By
“sanctity of treaties” was chiefl y meant the violation of the neutrality of
Belgium and Luxembourg.) Th e Council of the Allied Powers explained to
the German delegation that the envisaged proceeding “has not a judicial
character” and that William was “arraigned as a matter of high interna-
tional policy.” In fact, this whole exercise was somewhat theoretical, since
the ex- kaiser had fl ed to the Netherlands and been granted asylum. Requests
to the Dutch government for his extradition were rejected, and he remained
in that country until his death in 1941.
Th ere was some special business at hand concerning Turkey, stemming
from the massive deaths of Armenians at the hands of Turkish authorities
during the war. In May 1915, the Allied powers had issued a joint declaration,
condemning Turkey for “crimes against humanity and civilization”— the
fi rst appearance of that forbidding turn of phrase— and explicitly warning
that agents of the Turkish government would be held personally respon-
sible. In the Treaty of Sèvres (the peace treaty with Turkey), that promise
was fulfi lled by requiring the Turkish government to identify the persons
responsible for the massacres and to deliver them for trial by an interna-
tional tribunal.
In the event, however, the Treaty of Sèvres never entered into force. Th e
Turkish government did arrest fi ve persons for roles in the Armenian atroci-
ties, two of whom were convicted in its own courts for actions “against hu-
manity and civilization.” But the Ottoman government, fearing unrest if
trials continued, then halted further proceedings. By the time that peace
was fi nally made with Turkey, in 1923, that country’s bargaining position
had improved, so the Treaty of Lausanne made no provision for trials for the
Armenian massacres, or for war crimes trials of any kind.
Regarding Germans accused of war crimes, the provision for trials by the
Allied powers was quietly set aside. As a concession, Germany was allowed
to undertake trials itself (as Lansing and Scott had favored). Th e trials,
which got under way in Leipzig in 1921, did not go smoothly. Public opinion
in Germany was strongly against them. Opinion in the Allied states became