380 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )merely supplementary. Th e basis of the anterior law was the general human
sense of justice.
A position similar to that of Verdross was expressed by a most unlikely
fi gure: Erich Kaufmann, who, prior to the war, had been a stalwart of the
neo- Hegelian, voluntarist camp. Perhaps his war experience had done
something to dim his earlier enthusiasm for armed confl ict. He served in
the ranks of the German army and was wounded at the Battle of the Somme
(winning the Iron Cross in the pro cess). What ever the explanation, there is
no doubt that, aft er the war, his mind moved in diff erent directions than his
early neo- Hegelian thought. He had a high profi le in the German interna-
tional legal world, acting as a con sul tant to the German foreign ministry
and representing his country in a number of cases in the World Court,
chiefl y on minorities issues, with Poland on the other side. He also repre-
sented the Free City of Danzig in World Court litigation, and Austria in the
Customs Union case in 1931. His early neo- Hegelian stance was not wholly
repudiated. He remained very state- centered in his legal thought and, in
his politics, a conservative nationalist with an instinctive hostility to the
Wei ma r Republ ic.
Ironically, Kaufmann’s continued adherence to conservative nationalism
may have pulled him toward natural-law thought. Natural- law ideas could
be useful weapons for attacking the Versailles peace settlement. Positivism,
with its strong support for treaties as a principal source of law, off ered less
scope in this direction. In all events, aft er the war, Kaufmann discarded his
previous neo- Hegelian allegiance and endorsed the idea of an unwritten law
as the basis of positive law. In supporting the idea of “the unity of law in
all the domains of law,” he expressed sympathy for Kelsen’s monism. He
contended that natural law concerned “real categories of general and eternal
order.” In an outright repudiation of his own voluntarist past, Kaufmann
now expressly denied that law could be regarded as “a ‘creation’ of the will of
States.” It must be acknowledged that “there are unwritten rules of law which
are imposed upon [the] wills” of states. Th e only true source of interna-
tional law, he now maintained, is “objective reason.”
Kaufmann’s version of natural law resembled that of Verdross in being
strictly nontranscendental. His “fundamental norms of law” were seen as
the inner soul or formative force or living energy of the positive law.
In explaining this idea, he referred to “the inherence of reason in reality and