Dreams Born and Shattered 381the participation of reality in reason.” Natural law was therefore not re-
garded as being in outright opposition to positivism. Rather, these were re-
garded as two aspects of law— the external and the internal— operating in
coordination. Th e role of natural law in this partnership was to act as a kind
of inner force— a voice of conscience, if you will— guiding the pro cess of
positive lawmaking into constructive and cooperative channels.
In the English- speaking world— a heartland of empirical positivism—
two major fi gures had at least some affi nities to the natural- law tradition,
one in the United States and the other in Britain. Th e American was James
Brown Scott, the longtime leading fi gure in the American Society of Inter-
national Law (and editor of its journal), who was also active in the Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace. It was late in his career, in the
1930s, that he became increasingly disillusioned with positivism, of which
he regarded Grotius as the chief forerunner. He then took it upon himself
to publicize the work of the earlier Spanish writers— chiefl y Vitoria and
Suárez. In carr y ing on this intellectual missionar y activity, he inevitably
came to be knowledgeable about, and sympathetic to, the natural- law tra-
dition. His reward for this labor came in an artistic form. In 1935– 37,
work was undertaken on a large mural in the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C., depicting the great lawgivers of human history. In the
course of the painting, it was realized that no authentic likeness of Vitoria
could be located. To fi ll this gap, the Spanish friar was depicted with the
features of Scott— an interesting form of “job- sharing” in the quest for
immortality.
Th e British writer who spoke favorably of natural law was James L. Bri-
erly, professor of international law at Oxford. He candidly conceded that a
regard for natural law was a minority taste among international lawyers.
Modern writers, he wryly noted, tended to treat it as “a superstition which
the modern world has rightly discarded.” Brierly nonetheless praised the
natural- law tradition for its recognition of “the existence of purpose in law,”
and also for its constant reminder “that law is not a meaningless set of arbi-
trary principles to be mechanically applied by courts, but that it exists for
certain ends.” Th e practical contribution that natural law can make, in
Brierly’s view, is to provide a basis for dealing with situations that are not
covered by specifi c rules of treaties or customary law. Natural law could
make of international law a comprehensive, coherent, gapless system instead