Building Anew 409viet Union’s “internationalist duty” to the people of Czech o slo vak i a, in the
interest of safeg uarding t hat people’s “ow n socia list gains.” Kova lev contrasted
counterfeit self- determination (as it might be described) with true “socialist
self- determination.” What was envisaged was a sort of mutual- guarantee idea,
in which it was seen as the duty of each state within the socialist bloc to ensure
that each of its fellow members was able eff ectively to exercise its sovereign
right to institute socialist principles within its society. If necessary— as it was
now claimed to be— that mutual guarantee could involve armed action.
Th e Reagan Doctrine in the United States also provided a justifi cation for
armed intervention. In fact, it was candidly described by Reagan’s Secretary
of State George P. Shultz as the “opposite number” to the Brezhnev Doc-
trine. Th ere were some diff erences, though. Where the Brezhnev Doctrine
authorized force against like- minded states, the Reagan Doctrine concerned
armed action against countries of diff ering persuasions. It was, in essence, a
neo- just- war doctrine, asserting what its supporters characterized as “the
moral legitimacy of U.S. support— including military support— for insur-
gencies under certain circumstances.” Th ose circumstances were two: fi rst,
that the country concerned was being ruled, in undemo cratic fashion, with
material support from the socialist bloc; and, second, that an indigenous in-
surgency was in existence struggling against that government. When those
two conditions were fulfi lled, the United States was stated to be justifi ed in
aiding the insurgent movement. Such assistance was characterized as coun-
terintervention, in response to the socialist support for the government in
question. Th is was distinctly reminiscent of John Stuart Mill’s exception to
the otherwise strict principle of nonintervention in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In all events, supporters of the Reagan Doctrine frankly rejected the
principle of “inviolability of sovereignty.”
On the whole, it may be said that the Reagan Doctrine was more radical
than its Soviet counterpart from the standpoint of international law. Th is
was because the Brezhnev Doctrine was conservative in its eff ects— that is,
having the eff ect of bolstering established governments against dissidents—
whereas the Reagan Doctrine justifi ed support for insurgent groups seeking
to overthrow incumbent governments.
Like its Soviet counterpart, the Reagan Doctrine was no merely theoretical
matter. It was put to use in justifying support for an insurgency in Nicaragua
against a socialist- leaning government. Th e American assistance to these