436 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )reveals the way in which legal norms can escape from the control of their
creators and assume a life of their own— and sometimes a threatening one.
One notable instance of this has been observed: the Pact of Paris, which in
its inception was thought to apply only to the conduct of states but was later
held to entail criminal liability for individuals. Th e concept of self-
determination, similarly, was thought at its inception to have a relatively
limited application. Its function was to impose a legal obligation onto colo-
nial powers to grant in de pen dence to their colonies.
Self- determination began its juridical life in the UN Charter, which ex-
pressly identifi ed “the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peo-
ples” as one of the bases of friendly relations between states. A further step
was taken in 1960, when the UN General Assembly— now fortifi ed by many
newly in de pen dent members— adopted a Declaration on Decolonization,
which pronounced that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self- determination.”
More signifi cant was the inclusion of self- determination in both of the Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights in 1966.
Judicial support for the principle was forthcoming from the World Court.
In an advisory opinion in 1975, in the context of Spain’s relinquishment of
control over its colony of Spanish Sahara, the Court defi ned self- determination,
somewhat vaguely, as “the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of
peoples.” Since that time, no clearer idea of the content of the right has
emerged from the Court. In 1995, however, it did shed some light on its legal
status, confi rming it to be “one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law”— to the point that the duty of states to respect it was ex-
plicitly held to fall into the special category of duties owed to the world at
large and not merely to the struggling peoples themselves. Moreover, in
2004, it made an explicit fi nding, for the fi rst time, of a violation of it: by Is-
rael, in the form of the building of a security fence that encroached into the
Occupied Territories.
In the course of time, worries— or hopes— began to grow that the princi-
ple of self- determination might have (or acquire) a broader application than
had fi rst been supposed. It began to be asserted that the principle also ap-
plied to distinctive (and oft en disgruntled) minority groups within in de-
pen dent states. Some even contended that it could apply to the entire popu-
lation of in de pen dent states— thereby becoming a sort of surrogate version
of a general right of democracy. Th ere was much uncertainty on these matters