Shadows across the Path 441
the convention did not enter into force until 1994, many of its key provisions
were widely agreed to have entered into customary law.
One achievement of the new agreement was— at long last— to resolve the
vexed question of the width of territorial seas. States were now authorized to
claim territorial seas up to twelve miles off their coasts. But they were given,
in addition, a right to claim “exclusive economic zones” for up to two hun-
dred miles off shore, in which they would have fi shing monopolies. Th at
meant that some 90 percent of the world’s fi sheries now became state-
owned. States were also given own ership of continental shelves for a mini-
mum distance of 200 miles off shore and a maximum of 350 miles (depend-
ing on prevailing geo graph i cal features).
Among the consequences of this massive maritime “land grab” was a
large number of overlapping claims to off shore areas, once governments set
about availing themselves of their new prerogatives. Th ese were the sorts of
disputes that were tailor- made for resolution by way of international arbi-
tration or litigation. Th e po liti cal salience of these disputes was oft en too
low to spark much in the way of jingoistic fervor. Th e issues were commonly
highly technical in character, and there were various legal guidelines and
pre ce dents that could readily serve as a basis for resolution by in de pen dent
parties. Even before the draft ing of the new Law of the Sea Convention was
complete, the Court was put to work delimiting several off shore areas. Libya
litigated against both Tunisia and Malta over boundaries between their re-
spective continental shelves in the Mediterranean Sea, while the United
States and Canada contested an area of the Gulf of Maine.
Business was picking up at the World Court in other directions, too. In
Tehran in 1979, over fi ft y American diplomatic and consular personnel (plus
a few unlucky private citizens) were captured and held hostage under the aus-
pices of the religious- based government of Iran, newly installed following a
revolution. Th e spirit of Lars Tolumnius, it appears, lived on. Th e American
government reacted in an unexpected fashion, by seeking an order from the
World Court to Iran for the release of the captives. Never before had the Court
been brought into the thick of such a highly charged po liti cal crisis. Th e Court
issued a release order, which the Ira ni an government refused to carry out.
Th e government of Iran refused even to participate in the proceedings.
In 1980 came the full judgment, holding Iran to be in violation of the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (of 1961), to which both countries