Shadows across the Path 449Statute of the Yugo slavia Crimes Tribunal, which diff ered somewhat from
the general description that had suffi ced at the Nuremberg Trials (where, it
will be recalled, crimes against humanity played a very subordinate part in
the proceedings). A crime against humanity is what might be called a contex-
tual crime. Th at is to say, it consists of the commission of certain actions—
not, however, in isolation, but as part of a broader drama. Th at broader
drama is an attack on a “civilian population.” Th e specifi c act of, say, murder
or torture, when done on its own, is simply an ordinary crime. But if it is
done as part of an orchestrated attack on a civilian population, then— but
only then— it becomes a crime against humanity.
Crimes against humanity proved to be much more useful to the prosecu-
tors at the Yugo slavia Tribunal than genocide because convictions were
much easier to obtain. Th e reason is that, for crimes against humanity, there
is no requirement of an ultimate or long- term intention, as there is for geno-
cide. It is suffi cient if the accused person intended to commit the specifi c act
(such as murder or torture), while knowing that the act was being done as
part of an attack on the civilian population. Th ese elements are signifi cantly
easier to prove than the long- term intention required for genocide. Crimes
against humanity are also very useful (to prosecutors) in that subordinate
persons— the “cogs in the machine,” as it were— can readily be convicted.
Th e crime of genocide, in contrast, is directed, in eff ect, only at the leader-
ship. Th e reason is that, in practical terms, the necessary long- term inten-
tion is likely to be provable (if at all) only against the leaders and not the
followers. For these reasons, there were many convictions in the Yugo slavia
Crimes Tribunal of persons for crimes against humanity, and few for geno-
cide (though these included the Srebrenica massacre).
It was signifi cantly otherwise, though, for the second international crimes
tribunal created by the UN Security Council: the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. Th is was established by the UN Security Council in
1994, to deal with the massacres of that year. It began operations in 1997,
in Arusha, Tanzania. In the press, the Rwanda atrocities were universally
characterized as genocide— and in this instance, the use of the term by the
media was borne out in the legal judgments. Th e Rwanda Crimes Tribunal
produced the fi rst prosecutions and convictions for genocide in the his-
tory of international litigation. Th e fi rst person to be convicted (aft er a
guilty plea) was Jean Kambanda in 1998. No minor underling, he had