476 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )not being a party. Th is could occur if an American national committed an
off ense in the territory of a state party (e.g., in the course of military ser vice
abroad). Th e U.S. government accordingly embarked on a campaign of
concluding treaties with as many states as possible, in which those states
obligated themselves not to send American nationals to the custody of the
Court.
Th e United States also enacted legislation in 2002 to shield its government
offi cials from any possible prosecution before the Court. “[S]enior offi cials
of the United States Government,” the Congress formally pronounced,
“should be free from the risk of prosecution by the International Criminal
Court, especially with respect to offi cial actions taken by them to protect the
national interests of the United States.” Invoking “a fundamental principle
of international law that a treaty is binding upon its parties only,” the Con-
gress pronounced that the United States “will not recognize the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court over United States nationals.” It im-
posed a statutory bar against cooperation with the Court by American offi -
cials. More remarkably, it gave the president the authority “to use all means
necessary and appropriate”— words eerily close to the standard diplomatic
parlance for armed force— to eff ectuate the release of any American armed
forces personnel or government employees held in the Court’s custody.
Th ere was a backlash against the Court among African countries, too. For
one thing, there was unhappiness that all of the Court’s initiatives in its fi rst
ten years related to Africa. In addition, fears began to grow that criminal
prosecutions might interfere with peace negotiations. Th ese worries were
most acute with regard to civil strife in Uganda. In 2005, the Court issued
arrest warrants against fi ve leaders of an insurgency in the northern part of
the country. Concern began to be voiced that the criminal charges were in-
terfering with the larger and more important priority of bringing peace to
the strife- torn region. Among those contending that the indictments had
undermined the negotiations was the Ugandan government offi cial in
charge of peace negotiations with the insurgents. It was pointed out that the
Ugandan authorities were now unable to off er safe- conduct guarantees to
the indicted leaders for the holding of peace negotiations. Nor could it cred-
ibly promise an amnesty to insurgents in exchange for an end to the strife.
Th e government could, of course, promise that it would not take action, but
it was not able to prevent the International Criminal Court from acting.