Shadows across the Path 477
Similar objections were voiced by the Roman Catholic archbishop of the
area, who contended that peace negotiators would now be regarded by the
insurgents as agents of the International Criminal Court. Worries were ex-
pressed that there would be fewer defections from the insurgent ranks, as
members feared that future indictments might be brought against them.
Th ese various misgivings were reported to have a strong hold in the areas of
Uganda that had suff ered most seriously at the hands of the insurgents.
Similar considerations were evident in the Congo, where a leader of an
insurgent force was indicted by the International Criminal Court. Th e per-
son in question, however, far from being arrested, was made a general in the
Congolese army, in exchange for a promise to integrate his followers into the
national armed forces. Th e Congo government pointedly declined to arrest
him, on the ground that his presence was needed to maintain peace within
the Congolese military.
Th ere were misgivings, too, about the indictment of President Bashir of
Sudan. It was recalled that Milošević was arrested and brought before the
Yugo slavia Tribunal only aft er he had been toppled from power. Concern
was expressed that Bashir, and those like him, once indicted, had a strong
incentive to cling to power for the longest possible time— with the possible
eff ect of increasing the amount of suff ering and repression infl icted on those
under their rule.
It became apparent that there was considerable support for Bashir’s plight
on the part of other African leaders. Th e African Union requested the UN
Security Council to postpone action on the case. When it failed to do so, the
union responded by openly taking a collective stand in Bashir’s favor. In
2009, the Assembly of the AU expressly resolved that “the AU Member
States shall not cooperate [in] the arrest and surrender of President Omar El
Bashir.”
Bashir certainly had little trouble traveling to various African countries
for conferences or meetings with fellow heads of state. In 2010, he visited
Chad and Kenya and, in the following year, Djibouti— all of which were par-
ties to the International Criminal Court and consequently under a legal
obligation to arrest the fugitive and dispatch him to Th e Hague. None of
these governments took action against him. Th e Court responded by for-
mally notifying the UN Security Council, and the other state parties to the
Court’s statute, of these visits. Th at brought no response. “I have not felt