40 Law and Morality Abroad (to ca. ad 1550)
conjunction with diplomatic visits. Viewed from the Chinese standpoint,
these gift s could be seen as reinforcing Chinese— and especially Confucian—
ideals of in e qual ity and deference. Because, in the Confucian ideology, be-
nevolence was expected of an ideal emperor, it was not expected that China
would attempt to conquer the neighboring barbarian states or impose its
system onto them by force. It was suffi cient that the barbarians, by dutifully
presenting their “tribute,” acknowledged China’s position of supremacy. As
an indication of China’s benevolence toward its rough- hewn neighbors, gift s
would be given in return.
From the nomads’ perspective, the presents to the Chinese could readily be
regarded simply as routine acts of courtesy, rather than as a sign of subjection.
Persons with exacting minds (such as lawyers) might fi nd such an arrange-
ment to be frustratingly ill- defi ned. But that was part of its strength. It en-
abled both sides to save face. It was also very fl exible, easily adaptable to
changing balances of power. It was not unheard of for China’s gift s to the
neighbors to exceed in value the “tribute” received from them. Even a sharp-
eyed observer would sometimes have struggled to decide who was really pay-
ing tribute to whom. An unsentimental realist would have little trouble con-
cluding that this relationship was really a subtle arrangement for buying
security, with the accounts readily capable of shift ing in amount and direc-
tion over time. Be that as it may, the system seems, for the most part, to have
met the practical needs of both sides well enough. Precisely because the sys-
tem was so fl exible and adjustable, it could be very long- lasting. In the case
of relations with Korea, for example, it continued into the late nineteenth
century.
Th e tribute system may be regarded as the principal outward manifestation
of the imperial Chinese attitudes toward international relations. It should be
appreciated, however, that reality oft en diverged fairly considerably from the-
ory. For example, in ad 783 and again in 822– 23, the Chinese government
entered into treaties with Tibet on the basis of full equality of status of the
two parties. Th at is to say, the treaty was solemnly sworn by both sides and
accompanied by the negotiators’ smearing their mouths with animal blood.
Th ere is some especially instructive evidence of Chinese concessions to
harsh po liti cal reality dating from the period of the Sung dynasty (the elev-
enth to the thirteenth centuries ad). In this period, three or four neighbor-
ing states were regularly treated by the Chinese as kuo, or states of equal