68 Law and Morality Abroad (to ca. ad 1550)ethic of absolute pacifi sm. Th e solution was provided, at least in outline
form, by Augustine: to interpret the scriptures as prohibiting only egoistical
resorts to force, for the furthering of one’s own ends. Using force in an altru-
istic manner, to promote the welfare of others, was importantly diff erent.
On this thesis, Christians could be allowed to perform military ser vice for
the purpose of defending the Christian community as a whole against at-
tackers or oppressors. Even if military ser vice was not positively good in it-
self, it could still be praised as a necessary (if regrettable) burden imposed
upon worthy Christians by the depravity of the wrongdoers. Th is notion of
force being justifi ed in the general public interest, for the fi ghting of evil,
formed the core of medieval just- war doctrine.
Augustine himself did not trouble to go beyond the articulation of this
basic thesis. But in the centuries that followed, the idea underwent some
considerable elaboration. Th e details of just-war doctrine were never en-
shrined in a specifi c pronouncement of the Catholic Church, so that a number
of variant versions were put forward. Nevertheless, broad agreement evolved
on a fi vefold schema of just-war doctrine, fi rst set out in the early thirteenth
century by Raymond of Peñaforte, a Spanish Dominican who taught canon
law at the University of Bologna. Th e fi ve elements— all fi ve which had to
be satisfi ed— may be identifi ed briefl y (in no special order).
One element was auctoritas. Th is meant that war could be waged justly
only by a sovereign or by a subject at the command of a sovereign. It could
not be done by subjects on their own initiative. A second element was
personae. Th is meant that certain persons were prohibited from participa-
tion in war, no matter how clearly just the cause was. Most importantly, this
meant that clerics were barred from belligerent activity. Th ird was the re-
quirement of res. Th is word, meaning simply “thing” in Latin, signifi ed that
the war had to have a defi ned goal or purpose— that the “thing” being
fought over must be precisely identifi ed. Th e clear implication was that,
once this defi ned goal was attained, the war must stop. Th is principle, then,
had the function of preventing a war from dragging on or degenerating into
a confl ict driven simply by the mutual hatred of the parties for one another.
A fourth element of the schema— and in some ways at the very heart of the
just-war idea— was the requirement of iusta causa. Th is meant literally a “just
cause.” It should be noted that it meant a just cause in a strictly objective sense.
In the dispute over the res, the just side is the one with the stronger legal case.