Keeping Kings in Check 71It is important to appreciate, though, that, for a very long time to come, this
implicit ban on purely gratuitous destruction was the only limitation on vio-
lence in war time dictated by just- war doctrine. More specifi c rules— or at
least practices— on the conduct of war were devised in the course of time, as
will be seen. But they arose from sources other than just- war doctrine as
such.
It must also be appreciated that medieval just- war doctrine was (in mod-
ern terminology) radically asymmetrical in terms of the principles relating
to the conduct of war. Only the just side had any right to employ violence.
Any killing done by the unjust side was simply hom i cide, and any taking of
prisoners was kidnapping. For this reason, the unjust side had a legal duty to
compensate the just side for any damage that it infl icted in the course of the
confl ict.
Another general point about just- war theory is that, by its nature, it left
little room for consideration of neutrality. It could even be said that neutral-
ity was fl atly contrary to the spirit, if not quite the letter, of just-war thought.
Th e reason is easily seen. Since a just war was regarded as fundamentally a
confl ict for the suppression of evil, neutrality could hardly be seen in any-
thing like a positive light. If anything, there was a duty on the part of all
rulers to lend a hand to the just side in its struggle against the unjust one.
Th is was not taken to the point of actually requiring other states to join the
hostilities. But other states were expected to do nothing that would further
the cause of the wrongful belligerent and to show partiality to the just side
whenever feasible.
One fi nal general point about medieval Eu ro pe an just-war theory should
be appreciated. It must not be supposed that the proponents of the doctrine
were so naïve as to think that the just side would always prevail in a confl ict.
Th ere were simply too many examples in history— not to mention in the
Christian Bible itself— in which evil overcame good on the fi eld of battle.
Victory and defeat were determined by the vicissitudes of war (and perhaps
by the will of God as well), not by the legal merits of the dispute. Th e more
subtle, and important, point that follows on from this is that, if the unjust
side should happen to prevail in the struggle, it would not thereby obtain
any greater rights than it had prior to the outbreak of the hostilities. It was
never contemplated that mere might could make right. An unjust side that
triumphed in a war no more obtained a lawful title to the res in question