making. To a certain extent the USSR’s nervousness was justified. Nehru
was very careful to separate anti-imperialism from communism; the first
he would support, the second he would distance himself from, even if
its main goals at a given point were anti-imperialist. But Nehru was
careful to insist that the conference was not an alternative Asian bloc, nor
was it directed against either existing bloc, though he was more careful to
soothe the West. However, several delegates at Delhi proposed that such
meetings should continue as they could eventually provide a forum for
resisting the demands of either bloc.
Soon afterwards, the Korean War brought Nehru into international
negotiations again. The Korean peninsula had been partitioned along the
38th Parallel in 1948; on June 25, 1950, a UN Security Council resolution
(in the absence of the USSR, boycotting the Security Council in protest
against the Chinese place being occupied by the Taiwan government, not
the Beijing one) condemned North Korea for crossing the 38th Parallel.
On June 26, Truman pledged the USA to military intervention against
further communist expansion in Asia – outside Korea, the US 7th fleet was
sent in to protect Formosa, and military aid was provided to the French in
Indo-China. Nehru refused to accept the US view that the USSR was
behind the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and to tolerate US support for
a renewal of European imperialism in Asia. The British were also some-
what alarmed at the USA’s extreme position and sought instead to defuse
the situation.
Nehru’s neutralism now meant that he was well positioned to mediate.
When hostilities began, he strongly advised against the USA entering
North Korea, especially after it had already created tensions by bombing
Chinese territory in Manchuria – this, he said, would escalate the conflict
with China entering the fray. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson thought
this was a bluff on the Chinese part and ignored these warnings; but by
November Chinese forces had joined the war and had inflicted heavy
defeats on US forces. Soon things were looking to get out of hand. Now it
became essential to get an intermediary to defuse tensions – in November
1950, feelers were sent to India by British and American diplomatic
sources, asking for Indian mediation; US Assistant Secretary of State,
George McGhee, explicitly linked this to an offer of US food aid for
India, a request for which had been made earlier that year due to a severe
drought. The offered incentive of the aid package was opposed by the US
Treasury in January because, as one US official put it, ‘aid should be given
CONSOLIDATING THE STATE, c. 1947–55 201